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ABSTRACT

Author: Park, Gilchan. PhD
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: August 2018
Title: Towards Ontology-based Phishing Detection.
Committee Chair: Julia Rayz
Detection of phishing emails is a topic that has received a lot of attention both from academia
and industry due to the devastating effects that phishing enabled data breaches have had on
private individual and companies. Notwithstanding enormous efforts to detect phishing attacks,
phishing still remains a major threat in information security, and the damages from it are not
forecasted to disappear in the near future. One of the reasons is the diversity of attacks,
especially within spear phishing and whaling. Another reason is that the natural language part of
the detectors is usually devoid of semantics. Many of the existing phishing detection techniques
make use of keyword matching. However, phishers exploit genuine messages and users’
background information to forge counterfeit or fake baits so as to increase the success rate of
deception. Since phishers craft legitimate-looking emails, many common words between
legitimate emails and phishing emails appear in the email body. In addition, phishers often obtain
keyword lists used in the matching systems, and they can easily detour defensing mechanisms
that analyze the words of an email. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the
effectiveness of conceptualization for lexical features, which is hypothesized to reduce
vulnerability to variance in superficial characteristics. The proposed approach adds semantics to
highly accurate bag-of-words and part-of-speech approaches. This study shows that while the
current approach is not as effective as a starting point, it retains its performance as a testing
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corpus deviates from training, while the performance of the original approach decreases with the
amount of deviations.

1

INTRODUCTION

Phishing has become a ceaseless and devastating threat to companies and individuals.
Confidential and sensitive information exposed by phishing attacks is used by criminals to
achieve monetary gain or compromise organizations’ internal networks. Phishing is a social
engineering attack where phishers conceal themselves by disguising as trusted entity and abusing
unsuspecting victims’ minds to elicit privileged information from them. Attackers employ a
variety of communication channels -- e.g., email, IM (Instant Messaging), SMS (Short Message
Service), VoIP (Voice over IP), SNSs (Social Networking Sites), online games, etc. -- to launch
phishing attacks and typically carry out their attacks by sending fraudulent messages to users.
Adversaries maneuver the recipients to perform an action that leads to revealing sensitive
information. Security companies and researchers in information security have proposed technical
phishing defense mechanisms, and organizations and enterprises have adopted those technical
measures, as well as endeavored to train their staff to increase security awareness to fight
phishing attacks. Notwithstanding such efforts, phishers have continually invented sneaky ruses
to circumvent technical mitigations and produced ever more sophisticated phishing messages to
lure targets. As of today, there is no robust defense mechanism to effectively cope with the
breadth of such attacks, and phishing still remains extremely dangerous.

1.1

Research Problem

The most well-known medium of phishing attacks is email. Scammers leverage potentially
vulnerable aspects of the e-communication channel such as IP address, spoofed email addresses,
links, attachments, and especially email body text. To date, academics and industries have
endeavored to foil this security hazard, and a myriad of defense mechanisms have been proposed.
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Despite such efforts, phishing threats have been menacing users, and fraudsters have found ways
to bypass phishing detection measures. One possible explanation of this is that most security
defenses are based on superficial features of emails, which has been susceptible to continuously
newly-crafted phishing emails. For instance, once phishers find out a list of addresses in
blacklists or literal keywords registered as dangerous in email servers, they can easily re-forge
emails to infiltrate the systems (Liang, Su, You, Shi, & Yang, 2016).

Another defense is to educate users not to fall for phishing scams. User education has been
regarded as a strong security measure in that end users are the main vector in phishing attacks.
The aim of such education is to prevent a user from performing any kind of potentially risky
actions such as clicking on links in an email, or replying to an email, with the rationale that this
will limit the amount of user’s private information being disclosed to the attacker. Unfortunately,
education and phishing awareness campaigns have revealed that they are not the most effective
solution (Görling, 2006; Kirlappos & Sasse, 2012). If one employee does not recognize a
phishing email and hands over credential information to the adversary, the entire organization to
which the employee belongs can be compromised even though the other employees are well
educated and aware of phishing attacks. One difficulty of education is that the trends of phishing
are fast-paced. The materials used in a campaign to educate employees about the dangers of
phishing should be made of the most current phishing approach as well as possible unseen
schemes adopted by phishers, but new phishing approaches are not quite predictable, and
therefore, employees cannot be immune to such attacks solely by education. Another reason of
ineffectiveness of user phishing awareness education and campaign is the lack of appropriate
materials. Current phishing education is to encourage employees to pay attention to security
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indicators in applications, or to alert them simply providing known phishing emails. However,
users tend to ignore warning indicators even after the education, and they still believe their
abilities to detect phishing scams based on their experiences and intuitive (Kirlappos & Sasse,
2012).

Phishing is a cyber-attack exploiting human vulnerabilities, and users become hooked on a bite
while reading the body text of a phishing email. To ameliorate phishing problems, it is
imperative that a rigorous study be conducted to identify what email body text means and
conveys. Specifically, body text of emails needs to be analyzed semantically, and meaning of
words and sentences should be used as features to determine the email’s legitimacy.

1.2

Motivation for Research in Ontological Phishing Detection

Phishing is a mind game in favor of hackers for a purpose of tricking users. Understanding email
sender’s intention is essential and must be addressed in phishing detection. People in information
security for phishing detection should delve into the analysis of understanding body texts of
emails. To date, most researches have focused on non-semantical features which are not quite
relevant to sender’s intention understanding. To make it more complicated, phishers started to
forge targeted phishing emails such as spear phishing or whaling using obtainable personal
information in SNS. This kind of attempt often does not even contain any links or attachments,
which makes it difficult for the detection systems based on listing or malware analysis to catch
such emails.
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To start with intention analysis, it is needed to extract the meaning of email body content. To
achieve the goal, this dissertation introduces an ontology, which allows semantic processing of
email content.

1.3

Objectives of this Research

Phishers impersonate trusted entities by mimicking contents of emails and websites from genuine
sources. Thus, the literal differences between phishing email body and non-phishing email body
may not be significant. The subtle difference between the two domains can be found in the
information in the email body. The information exists in both explicitly stated text and implicit
meaning of text. The central hypothesis of this research is that “Machines can differentiate
phishing emails from legitimate ones based on the meaning of a text.” The hypothesis will be
tested by comparing classification of phishing and legitimate emails using on literal words as
features versus their meanings.

To resolve the problem of phishing detection, the dissertation aims to design an ontological
semantic processing for phishing domain. The purposes of phishing ontology construction
include the followings:


Conceptualization & Word Sense Disambiguation (WSD), captured in the lexicon;



Knowledge representation, captured in the ontology.

I conceptualize groups of words based on their meanings. Many words can refer to the same
meaning (synonyms). Conceptualization combines invariant words in terms of meaning into
concepts (word sense classes), and these concepts are used for distinguishable features between a
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phishing domain and a legitimate domain instead of classes based on literal words. The same
words frequently appear both in phishing emails and non-phishing emails. However, their
meanings are different depending on their usage (polysemy). The relations among words help
retrieve the word meaning pertinent to the user’s intention or needs. For WSD, the proposed text
analyzer finds the meaning of a word based on the relations of concepts in a sentence. The
ontological semantic processor is a knowledge-based system, and it generates knowledge
representations as outcomes. The concepts and their relations in a sentence are represented in a
specific machine-processible format. Each representation is a basic unit of ontological semantic
processing, and the knowledge representations cooperate with each other to tune their
representations.

The proposed research is the attempt to design an ontological semantic processing model for
phishing. It is expected that this version of ontological framework for phishing domain will be
shared with other knowledge engineers and be reusable for further expansion and improvements.

1.4

Assumptions, Limitations and Delimitations

Phishing has a common purpose of obtaining confidential information from people, and phishers
exploit genuine resources to deceive targets by trustworthy-looking contents. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that phishing and legitimate emails contain similar words. In addition, in
natural languages, there exist frequent words, and they are used universally. The frequent words
can appear in both phishing and legitimate emails; however, the sense of words might be
different since the purpose between the two domains is different.
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Phishing can be performed via various communication channels. This research focuses on
phishing emails among them. Emails have several attack vectors including headers, attachments,
links, and texts. This project has interests in semantic aspects of texts, and the analysis is limited
to the text part of emails. The used phishing data for this project consists of reported phishing
emails that are suspecting by the recipients but are not guaranteed to be actual phishing scams.
Although the phishing emails are not verified, the emails are regarded as phishing as users
perceive them as potential privacy threats.

With regard to semantic analysis of texts, the proposed method takes a sentence as a processing
unit. In other words, the semantic analysis is conducted in a sentence boundary. This project
aims to find a difference for action requests between phishing and legitimate emails. Since the
most action requests are initiated by verbs in a sentence, verbs and their direct dependents in a
sentence are considered in this project.

Sentences first need to be syntactically processed before semantic analysis can be completed.
Since creating a new syntactic analyzer demands a lot of labor time and costs, this project
adopted the existing syntactic parser, and it is assumed that the results of the parser are accurate.
Semantic analysis of a sentence produces a graph-based representation, and the semantic results
are presumed to be correct in that the semantic rules are defined and maintained by human
efforts.

1.5

Organization of Dissertation

The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows:
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Chapter 2: Literature Review — describes the overview of previous phishing defense approaches:
technical methods, educational methods and provides discussions on the drawbacks of current
anti-phishing systems. The subsequent ontology section describes the definition of ontology as
well as the existing ontological knowledge-based systems and reviews some of the ontologybased phishing detection works.

Chapter 3: Methodology — specifies the proposed experimental design. This chapter includes
datasets to be used for the experiments, and how to resolve the suggested research questions.

Chapter 4: Experiments — conduct the experiments using the proposed method and verify the
effectiveness of the approach. Discussions follow after each experiment.

Chapter 5: Conclusions and Future work — summarizes the research and expresses suggestions
to improve the methodology for phishing defense.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1
2.1.1

Phishing Definition
Generic Phishing

From the time phishing attacks emerged, phishing has been defined by many researchers, but the
definitions vary and do not always agree with each other. After observing various phishing
definitions, Lastdrager (2014) concluded that “Phishing is a scalable act of deception whereby
impersonation is used to obtain information from a target.” This definition represents
fundamental characteristics of phishing and abstractly encompasses a wide range of means by
which phishers carry out attacks.

One can examine other definitions, such as a definition of PhishTank 1 which states that
“[p]hishing is a fraudulent attempt, usually made through email, to steal your personal
information,” or a definition of phishing in Oxford Dictionary, where it is defined as “[t]he
fraudulent practice of sending emails purporting to be from reputable companies in order to
induce individuals to reveal personal information, such as passwords and credit card numbers.”
The PhishTank’s definition lacks explanation of a crucial part of phishing attacks which is a
semantic element. I agree with a point of view that phishing is a semantic attack where criminals
exploit human mind vulnerabilities. Heartfield and Loukas (2016) defined semantic attack as
“the manipulation of user-computer interfacing with the purpose to breach a computer system’s
information security through user deception.” The Oxford Dictionary definition limits the means
of phishing attacks that can be launched via other various communication channels.

1

A well-known public website containing phishing blacklist: https://www.phishtank.com/
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Lastdrager’s (2014) definition is also compatible with Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG)’s2
phishing definition which specifically focuses on emails and websites – “[p]hishing is a criminal
mechanism employing both social engineering and technical subterfuge to steal consumers’
personal identity data and financial account credentials. Social engineering schemes use spoofed
e-mails purporting to be from legitimate businesses and agencies, designed to lead consumers to
counterfeit websites that trick recipients into divulging financial data such as usernames and
passwords. Technical subterfuge schemes plant crimeware onto PCs to steal credentials directly,
often using systems to intercept consumers’ online account user names and passwords – and to
corrupt local navigational infrastructures to misdirect consumers to counterfeit websites (or
authentic websites through phisher-controlled proxies used to monitor and intercept consumers’
keystrokes.” Crimeware is a type of malware and is defined as software that perform illicit
activities that are anticipated to produce monetary gains for the attacker (Emigh, 2006).
Technical subterfuge schemes are, in general, followed by the users’ actions such as opening an
attachment (see Figure 2.1).

The malware’s activities typically follow these four steps: deceive a user to activate it, obstruct
technical defense, achieve its objectives, and finally propagate (Abraham & Chengalur-Smith,
2010). For instance, when a user opens an attachment file in an email, a keylogger can be
installed, or when clicking on a link, the user can be redirected to the phishing website by DNS
attacks. Therefore, the central part of phishing is to mislead users by fake information and lure
them to perform actions in favor of foes.

2

Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) is a consortium that brings together security professionals, business, law
enforcement agencies and other actors that are either affected by phishing attacks or fight them.
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Figure 2.1 Steps taken by malware to infiltrate a system (Abraham & Chengalur-Smith, 2010)

Phishers provide potential victims with fake situations where the users are urged to perform a
certain kind of an important action. The examples of typical situations are: a user’s webmail
storage is about to exceed the limit, a user’s bank account needs to be updated due to some
security measures, a user’s online transaction has not been processed due to incorrect
information that the user entered while purchasing the goods, etc.
2.1.2

Spear Phishing

As anti-spam filtering systems have become reinforced to withstand massive generic phishing
attempts and user awareness of generic phishing has increased, adversaries started to target
specific organizations or individuals and forge customized and sophisticated messages to
produce higher success rate by exploiting more human vulnerability and yield more profitable
returns than traditional phishing campaigns (CISCO, 2011). Such targeted phishing attacks are
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called spear phishing. Spear phishing is more sophisticated than generic phishing in that
fraudsters craft fake contents based on the personal and relevant information of the target which
makes the information seem to be more legitimate. To generate spear phishing messages,
cybercriminals harvest background information of targets from online available sources such as
social media sites (Caldwell, 2013). This kind of attack is not easily identifiable by non-technical
people, and even those well-versed in technology have difficulties to spot such fraudulent scams.
Spear phishing often target high-profile individuals and organizations in government. Once a
high-profile employee unknowingly supplies classified information, it leads to massive data
breaches and tremendous financial loss for the company. When spear phishing is launched
against high-profile targets who deal with the most confidential information, it is called “whaling”
(Markoff, 2008). Spear phishing and whaling are often used as an initial means of advanced
persistent threats (APTs) (Sood & Enbody, 2013).

When offenders launch spear phishing attacks, the possible scenarios can vary depending on the
target’s context. Users can receive messages containing malicious links from their friends’
accounts which were already compromised by phishers. Job seekers might reply to fake job
interview invitations without deeply scrutinizing the messages’ legitimacy due to their eagerness
to catch any chance. When spear phishing succeeds in a commercial enterprise, financial damage
can be very large. For example, if a phisher obtains a company’s chief accounting officer’s email
account, the phisher can send a spear phishing email to the company’s account manager to wire
money for a business to a specific bank account that actually belongs to the phisher. One of the
real incidents of a similar scenario occurred at Alpha Payroll firm in 2016 (Ragan, 2018). An
employee at the firm fell for a request that appeared to be from Alpha Payroll’s CEO. The spear

12
phishing email requested that “Copies of all the 2015 W-2 forms produced by Alpha Payroll on
behalf of its customers.” This successful attack compromised all of the 2015 W-2 records
generated by the firm for its clients.

2.2

Damage of Phishing Attacks

APWG reported that they observed a 250% increase in the number of phishing websites between
the 4th quarter of 2015 and the 1st quarter of 2016 (Anti-Phishing Working Group, 2016).
During the last quarter of 2015, APWG received 557,964 unique phishing reports. According to
the RSA fraud report (RSA, 2016), during the third-quarter of 2016, a total of 201,082 phishing
attacks were recorded in the global market. This volume represents a 54% rise over the same
time period last year. RSA expects that a new phishing attack is launched every 30 seconds, and
the annual cost of phishing to global organizations in 2017 will be $9.1 billion. Considering that
the global loss to phishing attack was $4.6 billion in 2015, the increase on the financial loss to
organizations is significant.

The notable part of the trend of phishing events is that spear phishing attacks have been
increasing (PhishLabs, 2016). In 2011, the financial gain of spear phishing attacks was three
times higher than the loss in 2010 (CISCO, 2011). Symantec research found that more than 400
businesses were attacked by spear phishing every day during the first half of 2016, and the
financial loss of the scam to businesses in the past three years was more than $3 billion, along
with more than 22,000 victims worldwide (Chandrasekar et al., 2017).

Spear phishing incidents have been continually reported in the last decade. In 2007, thousands of
executives across the country received a spear phishing email containing the recipient’s personal
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information (e.g., name, phone number, company) and a fake subpoena document purportedly
from the United States District Court in San Diego, and approximately 2,000 recipients fell for
the attack. Once a recipient clicks on a link embedded in the message to view the entire subpoena
document, it installs malware that steals keystrokes and sends the data to the adversary. Spear
phishing victimized RSA SecurID, the Canadian government, and ministers including the
Australian PM during 2010 and 2011 (Hong, 2012). Adversaries launched heavy spear phishing
attacks on energy companies from 2012 to 2013 to steal valuable information such as maps of a
new gas field or conduct sabotage attacks (Wueest, 2014). Spear phishing emails were also used
in the 2016 presidential campaign of Hillary Clinton chairman John Podesta’s Gmail account
compromise and former US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s Gmail account compromise. The
attackers in the Podesta’s case did not use any sophisticated technical schemes, but they put a
little effort on social engineering together with URL shortening service which is a simple tool.

2.3

The Purpose of Phishing

Understanding what phishers seek is an important step in phishing detection so that
countermeasures can pay more attention to the information targeted by attackers. Fraudsters
search victims’ private information such as login credential, residence information, Social
Security Number (SSN), Personal Identification Number (PIN), credit card details, etc., and they
misuse acquired information to gain monetary or political benefits by accessing financial
organizations or trading it in black markets and by accessing companies’ internal networks in
which they exploit confidential information for further criminal activities. A manual analysis of
phishing campaigns revealed that the phishers’ main targets were financial sites (e.g., PayPal,
banks) and large retailers such as eBay, Apple that have a large amount of online user accounts
(Kim & Kim, 2013; Tsalis, Virvilis, Mylonas, Apostolopoulos, & Gritzalis, 2014). Adversaries
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often utilize victims’ contact and social media connection information to deceive the victim’s
friends and social connections by impersonating the victim (Bilge, Strufe, Balzarotti, & Kirda,
2009). Sometimes, they simply conduct phishing attacks for their fame and notoriety (Weider,
Nargundkar, & Tiruthani, 2008).

Bursztein et al. (2014) observed the manual hijacking incidents that took place at Google from
2011 to 2014. They found that phishers targeted email account credentials the most followed by
bank credentials. The phishers accessed 20% of the stolen user accounts in half an hour, 50%
within 7 hours, and they searched for financial data the most in the user accounts. Bursztein et al.
(2014) further found that the phishers forged another phishing scam exploiting user’s contact
information, and they deleted the user’s emails and contacts. The attackers even altered account
settings so that the recovery time would be delayed after incidents became disclosed. The
phishers also created doppelganger accounts (i.e. using the same user email name with different
email service provider) and reached the victim’s contacts using the doppelganger accounts which
might seem to be legitimate to the recipients.

Lazarov, Onaolapo, and Stringhini (2016) set up a Google account and created five decoy
spreadsheets in it to monitor potential criminals’ activities of using the information in the
spreadsheets. More specifically, the authors populated fake bank account details with fake
payment links in the spreadsheets, and they shared the URLs pointing to the spreadsheets on a
public website. During the 72-day observation period, Lazarov et al. (2016) discovered over 150
accesses to the spreadsheets, and the visitors clicked on the embedded links over 150 times.
When the authors shared the links to the spreadsheets in the public website, they first disguised
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as a hacker who stole the payroll data, and later as a naïve user inadvertently sharing such
information in which the leaked information seemed more reliable. The number of access to the
spreadsheets between the two situations was not significantly different, which might imply that
attackers always eagerly seek for financial information. Onaolapo, Mariconti, and Stringhini
(2016) conducted similar study to the previous work, and they set up 100 decoy Gmail accounts,
and monitored cybercriminals’ activities for seven months (25/6/2015-16/02/2016). During the
observation, the criminals searched for financial related and contact information by keywords
such as ‘bitcoin’, ‘family’, ‘payment’, ‘account’.

2.4

Previous Phishing Detection Schemes

The spike in phishing activities at large calls for action within the information security industry
to create ways of detecting and preventing such attacks. Research into the area of phishing
detection has yielded several types of phishing defense mechanisms. Largely, anti-phishing
solutions are categorized as software classification approaches or as education approaches
(Khonji, Iraqi, & Jones, 2013).
2.4.1

List-based Techniques

Blacklisting is the activity of collecting the list of malicious resources (e.g., URLs and IP
addresses of phishing websites) used in previous phishing attacks, and blacklists are used to
check if unknown contents contain any noxious materials registered in blacklists (Prakash,
Kumar, Kompella, & Gupta, 2010; Jian Zhang, Porras, & Ullrich, 2008). PhishTank is a wellknown repository of phishing blacklist where users report suspicious sites and users’ votes
determined whether the reported sites are actual phishing sites or not (Hong, 2012). To date,
PhishTank has received around 5 million reports and more than 16 million votes. Since most
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phishing websites are short-lived, a large amount of URLs registered in PhishTank are
deprecated and no longer valid. To mitigate this issue, PhishMonger collects the data files of
phishing websites addressed by PhishTank’s URLs such as images, text, script so that
researchers can historically analyze phishing websites (Dobolyi & Abbasi, 2016).

On the opposite side of the spectrum, whitelists are a set of trustworthy sources, and if a new
message does not have any match with an item of the list, the message is labeled as dangerous.
Jain and Gupta (2016) proposed a whitelist-based approach to overcome drawbacks that
blacklist-based approaches pose such as vulnerability to zero-day attacks. The whitelist in their
system contains DNSs and the corresponding IP addresses to avoid DNS attacks such as DNS
cache poisoning. Li, Berki, Helenius, and Ovaska (2014) compared the effectiveness between an
anti-phishing toolbar based on blacklists and one based on whitelists, and the detection rates
were not significantly different between the two.
2.4.2

Heuristic-based Techniques

List-based approaches, in general, are exact matching systems. Finding best matches can
complement exact matching systems which can be too strict to cover variants. Heuristic-based
anti-phishing approaches analyze characteristics of phishing materials such as email addresses,
links, URLs, and webpages, many of which are used in list-based techniques as well. Anomalous
patterns in phishing links and URLs are compared with the patterns of a new one to determine
whether it is harmful (Chen & Guo, 2006; Darling, Heileman, Gressel, Ashok, &
Poornachandran, 2015; Khonji, Iraqi, & Jones, 2011a, 2011b; Le, Markopoulou, & Faloutsos,
2011) or extracted common keywords in phishing URLs are compared with ones in new URLs to
examine the legitimacy of the URLs (Garera, Provos, Chew, & Rubin, 2007).
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Phishers often exploit users’ browsing behavior habits to succeed with attacks. Tabnabbing
attacks refer to changing a trustworthy webpage to a rogue site in a certain time since people
normally do not close legitimate sites in web browser tabs and forget what they opened as the
number of tabs increases (Raskin, 2010). When the user returns to the tab without realizing that
the tab has been replaced, the user eventually gives the sensitive information through the reforged phishing website. De Ryck, Nikiforakis, Desmet, and Joosen (2013) developed a browser
extension to detect malicious websites by comparing the initial webpage with the modified one.
The browser extension alerts a user by displaying a colored overlay for the changed areas of the
webpage.

Some of the previous works measured the visual similarity between phishing sites and legitimate
ones to detect phishing webpages (Chen, Dick, & Miller, 2010; Maurer & Herzner, 2012). Ardi
and Heidemann (2016) developed an anti-phishing web browser plug-in based on whitelisting
and visual similarity techniques which supports customization. Their add-in stores legitimate
sites’ URLs and contents of a user’s choice, and it compares contents of good pages with
contents of unknown webpages by using hashes of DOM elements such as chunks from <p> or
<div> tags to verify the legitimacy of the unknown websites.

Another critical attack vector in phishing is the text parts of messages or webpages that
eventually plays a role to induce users to do some actions in favor of phishers. To find
distinguishable features in phishing messages, Aggarwal, Kumar, and Sudarsan (2014) adopted
natural language techniques to handle unstructured natural language texts. They performed
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lexical analysis of texts to find literal patterns and checked if emails contain any predefined
dangerous words derived from the phishing data. To expand the scope of analysis unit and deal
with word variations, the synonyms of words were included.
2.4.3

Machine Learning Techniques

Researchers started to deploy Machine Learning (ML) approaches in phishing detection systems
to analyze patterns in phishing contents based on statistical methods. The works in this category
differ from heuristic-based techniques in that ML algorithms assign the weight of each feature by
programmatic statistical calculations and make data-driven decisions that might ameliorate the
flexibility issue of manually tuned rules. Figure 2.2 depicts the overall process of ML analysis
for phishing detection.

Figure 2.2 The overall process of ML analysis for phishing detection

The previously proposed phishing detection works based on ML basically follow the above
diagram. They differ in the feature selection, including how to assign weights on the features,
and the selection of algorithms. The possible features are extracted from data such as the number
of dots in links, domain names in URLs, the length of URLs, word list in the text, and
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characteristics of phishing websites. The performance of ML algorithms heavily depends on data
and feature selection.

The ML classification results are measured by the metrics described in Table 2.1. This table does
not contain all of the measurements used in ML, but they are the basic and general criteria.
Table 2.1 Evaluation Metrics for phishing classification
Metric

Meaning

TP: True Positive

Correctly classified phishing emails as phishing

TN: True Negative

Correctly classified legitimate emails as legitimate

FP: False Positive

Incorrectly classified legitimate emails as phishing

FN: False Negative

Incorrectly classified phishing emails as legitimate

Accuracy
=

|𝑇𝑃| + |𝑇𝑁|
|𝑇𝑃| + +|𝑇𝑁| + |𝐹𝑃| + |𝐹𝑁|

Precision =

|𝑇𝑃|
|𝑇𝑃| + |𝐹𝑃|

Recall(Sensitivity) =

|𝑇𝑃|
|𝑇𝑃| + |𝐹𝑁|

𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
𝐹1 = 2 ×
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙

The percentage of correct predictions

The percentage of positive predictions that are
correct

The percentage of positive labeled instances that are
predicted as positive

The harmonic mean of precision and recall
It considers both the precision and the recall of the
test to compute the score
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Abu-Nimeh, Nappa, Wang, and Nair (2007) compared phishing detection abilities of well-known
ML algorithms including Bayesian Additive Regression Trees, Classification and Regression
Trees, Logistic Regression (LR), Random Forest (RF), and Support Vector Machine (SVM).
Abu-Nimeh et al. (2007) tested them using 43 bag-of-words features selected from subject and
body texts of emails based on Term Frequency and Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF).
Their results presented that RF performed the best among the others for true positives, and LR
had the minimum false positives. Chandrasekaran, Narayanan, and Upadhyaya (2006) fed natural
language features of emails into a SVM classifier, and it showed a promising result for phishing
email detection. Bergholz et al. (2010) proposed a SVM phishing email classifier using various
features from email structure, links, texts, images. They adopted topic modeling techniques to
find clusters of words and analyzed hidden texts which help phishing emails bypass classifiers.
The classifier achieved outstanding results with 99% accuracy. Ramanathan and Wechsler (2012)
used multiple algorithms for phishing email detection. Ramanathan and Wechsler (2012)
corrected deliberately misspelled words by phishers, and applied Probabilistic Latent Semantic
Analysis (PLSA) that mitigates the problems with synonyms and polysemy to find topics in
email body texts. The extracted features by PLSA were used to build an AdaBoost classifier
using LR, and Co-Training algorithm further trained the classifier on a large set of labeled and
unlabeled data. The performance of their model showed a F-measure of 100%.

The SVM classifier based on URL’s structure and lexical features detected phishing URLs with
99% accuracy (Huang, Qian, & Wang, 2012). Ma, Saul, Savage, and Voelker (2009) investigated
textual patterns in URLs and characteristics of hosts of URLs, fed the features into three ML
algorithms: Naïve Bayes (NB), LR, and SVM, and the results showed that the LR and the SVM
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classifiers performed similarly surpassing the NB classifier. Feroz and Mengel (2015) adopted kmeans clustering which is an unsupervised learning algorithm for phishing URL classification,
and the result showed over 98% accuracy. Marchal, Saari, Singh, and Asokan (2016) utilized
uncontrollable parts of URLs for phishers (e.g., registered domain names), and characteristics of
phishing sites (e.g., the number of terms and input fields), and included them into the feature sets
for Gradient Boosting (GB) algorithm resulting in over 97% accuracy with almost zero false
positives. Huang et al. (2017) leveraged surrounding word features of embedded URLs in emails
for RF classifier training to detect malicious domains, and the classifier showed high detection
accuracy.

Xiang, Hong, Rose, and Cranor (2011) extracted features from URLs, HTML forms, and
webpages, and they compared six ML algorithms with the features: SVM, LR, Bayesian
Network (BN), Decision Tree (DT), RF, and AdaBoost. The results showed that BN consistently
performed the best. Chen, Stepan, Dick, and Miller (2014) collected legitimate websites as image
files, and their system calculated the distance between the content information of legitimate
image files and the content information of rendered image from the phishing webpage, and
determined whether to flag the webpage as phishing site based on ML algorithms’ decision. The
authors used each string or pixel distance as a feature for algorithms. They tested DT, RIPPER
rule induction, LR, and SVM, and LR performed the best among them. Moghimi and Varjani
(2016) applied SVM for phishing webpage detection, and the performance of the classifier
showed over 99% true positives and below 1% false negatives. Marchal et al. (2017) developed a
client-side tool to detect phishing webpages using a whitelist and a GB classifier that used
webpage features (e.g., URL characteristics, terms in webpage) for training, and the evaluation
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of the model resulted in 99% accuracy and the tool received positive opinions from users in
terms of usability.

Rajab (2017) adopted DT and RIPPER rule induction algorithms to detect phishing webpages,
and he combined Information Gain and Chi-square feature selection methods in an attempt to
find the optimal set of features from dataset. The evaluation of over 11,000 websites showed that
the classifiers with the combined feature selection methods outperformed the other classifiers
with each respective feature selection method.

Attackers often attach malicious files to phishing emails. When a user opens the attachment in
phishing emails, unwanted malware can be installed in the user’s machine by which the
adversary is able to exploit the compromised machine and gain access to the user’s organization
internal network. Nissim, Cohen, and Elovici (2017) analyzed Microsoft Word XML-based files
(docx) that are frequently used in phishing attacks. Phishers stealthily include harmful contents
such as macro codes in docx files that perform spiteful actions. Nissim et al. (2017) extracted
paths of elements in the documents that characterize elements’ properties and actions, and used
them as features for ML classifiers. They compared five ML classifiers (J48 - DT, RF,
LogitBoost, LR, SVM), and among them SVM performed the best resulting in over 99%
accuracy.

Malisa, Kostiainen, and Capkun (2017) proposed an approach to detect mobile application
spoofing attacks which fool users to divulge their credentials via camouflaged mobile
applications that emulate genuine ones. The authors extracted features of elements in login
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screens (e.g., background color, shapes and positions of logo and input fields), and the evaluation
of using cross-validation showed that RF performed best compared to Lasso, LR, DT, GB.
2.4.4

Spear Phishing Detection Techniques

Spear phishing has different characteristics from conventional phishing (i.e., massive attacks on
numerous recipients) in that attackers tailor spear phishing messages using harvested targetspecific information. The manual analysis of politically-motivated spear phishing emails
demonstrated that phishers put more efforts on social engineering schemes than technical
schemes (e.g. malware), and the adversaries obtained target relevant information from public
sources such as news article, or they conducted surveillance to create benign-looking messages
and impersonate the trusted identity (Hardy et al., 2014).
2.4.4.1 Leveraging Features from Spear Phishing Message Itself
Given the fact that spear phishing emails contain recipients-specific materials, Amin, Ryan, and
Van Dorp (2012) extracted features from spear phishing emails targeted to a specific
organization and trained the Random Forest ML classifier with the features. The features include
the average number of spear phishing messages that recipients received, the average number of
search engine counts for recipients, email size, encoding types, etc. The Random Forest classifier
trained by the organization-specific features outperformed existing malicious email filtering
systems in the detection of spear phishing emails.

Han and Shen (2016) extracted the features from spear phishing emails and used them as features
for their semi-supervised learning framework based on k-Nearest Neighboring (kNN) algorithm.
The used features include email header information, text information (e.g., length of text, email
topics, text writing style), size and type of attachment, and recipient information (e.g., recipient’s
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domains, organization information). Their model performed the classification with high accuracy
in the test data, and notably when it was deployed in real world settings, the system identified an
unseen spear phishing campaign.
2.4.4.2 Models based on Features from Social Data
Le Blond et al. (2014) manually analyzed malicious emails sent to Non-Governmental
Organization employees by referring to publicly available information of user profile from social
media sites, and they found that numerous recipients received targeted messages that the
adversaries crafted using the recipients’ mother tongue and relevant events, and the adversaries
impersonated high-profile entities that the victims knew.

Based on the fact that spear phishing utilizes potential victims’ contextual information, Dewan,
Kashyap, and Kumaraguru (2014) extracted social features from LinkedIn and used those
features (e.g., job type & level, location, the number of connections) as well as stylometric
features of email texts including vocabulary richness, number of unique words, characters, and
new lines to build ML classifiers for spear phishing email detection. Their results showed that
the features from LinkedIn did not help the classifiers to detect spear phishing emails.

Kotson and Schulz (2015) pointed out that the work by Dewan et al. (2014) solely focused on
literal characteristics of LinkedIn profiles, and they further investigated the correlation between
spear phishing emails and LinkedIn profiles by applying a topic modeling technique which
identifies semantic structures in texts. They compared Curriculum Vitae inserted into spear
phishing emails with LinkedIn profiles of the targeted people using n-gram (a sequence of n
consecutive words) model and the Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) which clusters data into
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topics. Their findings demonstrated that phishers targeted specific individuals and conducted
reconnaissance on the targets before they launched the attacks.
2.4.4.3 User Profiling-based Approaches
Phishers leverage compromised employee accounts of a company to lure other employees in the
company. IdentityMailer (Stringhini & Thonnard, 2015) was designed and developed to detect
spear phishing emails based on profiles for the email-sending behavior of users in a corporation.
Employees’ behavioral profiles are built on extracted features from their sent emails in the past
which include writing habits (e.g., special word or character frequency), composition and
sending habits (e.g., whether to include a signature), and interaction habits (e.g., contact list of a
user sends emails the most). IdentityMailer catches any anomalous behavior against the
employee’s profile when an email is sent by the employee’s account. In order to ameliorate false
positives, IdentityMailer operates on a sender-side, and when IdentityMailer finds an email to be
anomalous, the user is given identity-verification process, which only the real account holder can
pass. The sender-side processing reduces users’ concerns over missing important messages.

IdentityMailer (Stringhini & Thonnard, 2015) was specifically designed for corporate users, the
data used for IdentityMailer is stored in a corporate’ mail server, and thereby IdentityMailer is
limited to be deployed to other domains exclusively. To overcome the limitation, Duman,
Kalkan-Cakmakci, Egele, Robertson, and Kirda (2016) proposed a client-side user email
profiling approach (called EmailProfiler) to detect spear phishing emails. The authors attempted
to detect relationships between recipients and senders based on both behavioral profiles which
consists of metadata of email header and stylometric features from email body text. The SVM
classifier was trained using the behavioral features, and the profiling evaluation (i.e., the
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verification of email authorship) of 20 volunteer participants’ emails represented a 98%
accuracy.

Edwards, Larson, Green, Rashid, and Baron (2016) developed the automated vulnerability
assessment tool to provide an organization with its vulnerability to social engineering attacks
initiated from the information of its employees’ online social activities. The authors first
investigated the most critical information available from open source intelligence (e.g.,
organization websites, social media sites) that facilitate attacks via interviews with expert social
engineering penetration testers, and the key components by the interviews included company
supplier and partner information, social media connections and friends, name of person with job
title, etc. The authors used personal features (e.g., name, profile picture, activity time, writing
style), social graph feature, and geographical feature for ML algorithms. The developed scanner
was able to find employees’ social media profiles from the initial seed data that was an
organization’s employee roster page.
2.4.5

The Weaknesses in Current Defense Techniques

The previous works with different aspects mentioned above proved their usefulness within the
experimental environments. However, most technical security defenses are based on superficial
features such as email header information, URL characteristics, literal patterns, page layouts of
sites. Phishing detection mechanisms using such superficial characteristics derived from the
previous scams have counter-attacked phishing with limited success and have continually
become susceptible to newly-crafted phishing attempts.
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List-based techniques entail a demanding task to maintain a large collection of malicious and
innocuous sources. Updating the lists quickly is labor-intensive, and the lists cannot always hold
up-to-date sources. Han, Kheir, and Balzarotti (2016) monitored phishing attacks using a
honeypot over a five-month period, and one of their findings was that two well-known blacklists
- Google Safe Browsing and PhishTank were not updated fast enough to detect new phishing
sites. In addition, one of the main sources of blacklists is users’ reports, but the reports cannot be
always accurate. In particular, public blacklist repositories such as PhishTank might contain
incorrect sources due to the users’ wrong votes (Moore & Clayton, 2008). Whitelists contain
trustworthy sources; however, it is also hard to expect that they hold all genuine websites across
the vast size of the Internet. Therefore, list-based approaches often produce false negatives
(missing phishing) or false positives (filtering out legitimate) (Gupta, 2007).

Most of the anti-phishing tools using blacklists missed significant phishing URLs, and when a
tool showed a high phishing detection rate, it misidentified a large portion of legitimate URLs as
phishing (Zhang, Egelman, Cranor, & Hong, 2006). Blacklisting techniques are vulnerable to
unseen cases such as URLs created by automatic URL generators (Hong, 2012). Sheng et al.
(2009) investigated the effectiveness of eight anti-phishing toolbars (six use only blacklists and
the other two use both blacklists and heuristics) on 191 phishing URLs. Their findings revealed
that most of toolbars were not effective in fighting against zero-day phishing attacks by catching
less than 20% of phishing URLs in the initial detection stage although the detection rate became
improved as the blacklists were updated. Due to the small size, whitelists are normally used with
blacklist and heuristic approaches as a complement; however anti-phishing tools using whitelists
require users to add safe websites, which is a burden on users (Al-Daeef, Basir, & Saudi, 2016).
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The heuristic techniques pose a difficulty to maintain the robustness of features and a potential
risk of producing high false positives. Phishers frequently alter features in URLs and do not
maintain phishing domains for long, at most three days (McGrath & Gupta, 2008). A recent
study further investigated phishers’ activities that adversaries reuse the same site contents simply
replacing domain or host names, but most of the sites using the same contents are only
maintained less than a month (Cui, Jourdan, Bochmann, Couturier, & Onut, 2017). Thus, the
patterns from previous phishing URLs and site contents become susceptible to phishing attacks
with unseen patterns.

In the same vein, the approaches based on lexico-syntactic patterns in texts reveal the limitations
when handling phishing messages containing new lexico-syntactic features. Furthermore,
phishing messages and legitimate messages share many common words, and literal patterns are
limited to tell the difference (Park & Taylor, 2013). The manual analysis of phishing messages
revealed that while phishers repeatedly used particular words and the frequently used words cooccurred to form security and privacy threats, they employed causal reasoning elements as well
as emotional factors to bolster the persuasive impact (Kim & Kim, 2013). The previous study
analyzed and compared the syntactic elements of sentences between phishing messages and
legitimate ones, and the results demonstrated that the same verbs frequently appeared in both
phishing messages and legitimate ones but were used with different objects (Park & Taylor,
2015). This implies that even though the literal patterns in phishing resemble the ones in
legitimate emails on the surface, their semantic patterns might not be alike. Another drawback of
heuristic approaches is the difficulties of finding an appropriate threshold to their values that

29
might need to be adjusted over time, and some of client-side tools using heuristics require users
to adjust the threshold, which is not an easy task for users (Al-Daeef et al., 2016).

A lot of work using ML algorithms have been proposed; however, their performances varied,
which implies that no standard algorithm exists for phishing detection. In addition, most of the
approaches showed promising results from the existing data, but they became susceptible to
zero-day phishing attacks which contain unseen features for the classifiers (Almomani, Gupta,
Atawneh, Meulenberg, & Almomani, 2013). It is imperative to obtain sufficient pure data and
find representative features for ML algorithms; however, Sahoo, Liu, and Hoi (2017) surveyed a
wide range of ML approaches for phishing URL detection and expressed the challenges of
applying ML algorithms: acquiring proper data within a tremendous amount of available sources,
coping with ever-growing feature dimensionality, and adaptation to quickly changing phishing
characteristics.

Another important consideration is that phishers can target phishing detection techniques. Liang
et al. (2016) decrypted and reverse-engineered features used in Google Phishing Page Filter
which is a client-side phishing webpage ML classifier with little effort, and they demonstrated
that the existing tool posed exploitable weaknesses by adversaries (e.g., manipulation of features
for the classifier).

User specific defense systems (e.g., the use of users’ SNS information, user profiles construction)
have emerged to counter-attack against spear phishing. Such work is worthwhile as it takes into
account targets’ contextual information and historical behavioral patterns that are not discovered
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from solely analyzing the contents of phishing attempts. It is vital to utilize implicit
characteristics to catch subtle differences between spear phishing messages and benign ones.
While the proposed works showed some promising results, detection of abnormal activities can
be further achieved by analyzing semantic elements in contextual information as well as the
collection of superficial features such as lexico-syntactic patterns.

Due to the privacy concerns that lead to the difficulty of spear phishing data acquisition, spear
phishing detection approaches have not been conducted with adequate spear phishing samples.
Collecting such data still remains a challenging task, but it is definitely needed to build
frameworks and repositories to assemble spear phishing data with anonymized victims’ identity
to secure privacy.

Although it is still important to provide further protection mechanisms to detect rendered
contents by the user’s first action such as clicking on embedded links in messages, ideally,
technical security strategies should be set up at the first phase of the phishing attempt process in
which a user initially gets fooled. Once phished by message, a user faces more dangerous
situations than the initial stage.

The proposed technical mitigations are state of the art even though they pose some limitations.
The majority of the approaches have handled visual and superficial characteristics of phishing
attacks, and they have the ability to detect explicit characteristics of phishing that humans miss
or do not pay close attention to; however, they are vulnerable to unseen cases and modified
version of the previous attempts (e.g., change in literal patterns), and do not count semantic
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factors that humans might be able to catch, which provides further cues to identify the subtle
enticement of phishing message (Park, Stuart, Taylor, & Raskin, 2014).

To ameliorate the current anti-phishing techniques and deter phishing attempts at the very
beginning, the researchers in the phishing domain need to take into further consideration the
fundamental characteristic of phishing, which is a semantic aspect of the attack. It is imperative
that rigorous studies be conducted to identify what the phishing message means and conveys,
including the hidden meaning such as intention. More precisely, phishing messages need to be
analyzed semantically, and the semantic features (e.g., word senses, contextual information,
semantic correlation between the message and the recipient context as well as scripts (Schank &
Abelson, 1975)) should be used to determine the legitimacy of the activity.

While few works attempted to leverage semantic characteristics to derive implicit clues, the
ontological approaches were not equipped with enough processing scope, and the statistical
semantic representations (e.g., LSA, PLSA) are limited to extract pure semantic relations in text
as well as model and reflect human knowledge (Jones, Kintsch, & Mewhort, 2006; Steyvers &
Tenenbaum, 2005). Human understanding of texts goes beyond literal patterns or mathematical
calculations, and people find suspiciousness of the message based on the understanding of it
using their context. Although computational semantics is an ever-challenging task, it is an
important moment to ameliorate and embrace this technical angle for the improvement of
machines’ ability.
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It has been argued in the 1970s that understanding of text is difficult without context, and context
can be provided by so called scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1975) – a situation that is encoded in a
computer with everything that is expected to happen. Because humans have the knowledge of
what is expected, providing a script (such as what happens at a restaurant) to a computer helps to
decrease the knowledge gap about missing text. While Schank and Abelson (1975) provided an
example of a restaurant (and typical interactions between hostess, customer, waiter, etc.), the
same idea applies to emails, bank accounts, etc. In order to identify what is affected when a user
discloses the password, one needs to provide a script describing general knowledge of
information stored and potential links to other accounts. Figure 2.3 summarizes the drawbacks of
each technical approach and suggests how to improve phishing detections.

Figure 2.3 The Drawbacks of Technical Approaches and Suggestion for Improvement
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2.4.6

Educational Approaches

The attackers focus more and more on exploiting users since “the human factor is truly security's
weakest link” (Mitnick & Simon, 2011). Once a semantic attack is successful, the attacker will
readily gain confidential information from a victim without having to learn sophisticated
technical knowledge to break into the defense systems. Organizations and information security
advocates acknowledged that end users are the main vector of phishing threats, and user phishing
awareness, threat perceptions, and technical knowledge related to phishing need to be reinforced
by training and education programs to make users vigilant against potential identity theft. The
effectiveness of user education has been demonstrated, and the importance of user education has
been emphasized (Jansson & von Solms, 2013; Zielinska et al., 2014).

Aburrous, Hossain, Dahal, and Thabtah (2010) illustrated that 16 out of 50 participants divulged
their online banking credentials (username and password) through simulated phone phishing
scams, and 52 out of 120 participants were lured by a fake bank website crafted for the phishing
experiment, even including eight IT department employees. That study found that those who
became familiar with phishing identified phishing websites and legitimate ones better than the
participants who had never known about phishing. A scenario-based role-play experiment
demonstrated that user phishing awareness helped increase users’ phishing email detection, and
another finding of the experiment represented that phishing detection ability was not different
between computer-naïve users and computer-savvy users unless computer-savvy users were
aware of phishing (Clarke et al., 2012). Alsharnouby, Alaca, and Chiasson (2015) also showed
that there was no relation between phishing susceptibility and general technical expertise. The
pilot survey of 232 computer users revealed that those well-versed in technology being familiar
with other information security risks except phishing were not quite able to detect phishing, but
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those who were educated by phishing awareness recognized phishing attempts better (Downs,
Holbrook, & Cranor, 2007).
2.4.6.1 Training Materials
With respect to training materials, the materials should convey not only the seriousness of
phishing attacks, but also how to distinguish phishing contents from legitimate ones. As
mentioned before, the increase in user awareness of phishing risks helps users’ phishing
avoidance, however, solely boosting phishing awareness does not seem to be enough for users to
properly cope with phishing threats (Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor, 2006). Zielinska et al. (2014)
demonstrated that the training only focusing on the real-world consequences of phishing without
tips to discriminate between phishing emails and legitimate ones resulted in an increase in false
positives in phishing detection. Jeske and van Schaik (2017) argued that the level of awareness
of cyber security threats was not always linked to the people’s security capability, and instead the
security capability relies on how users are familiar with security measures against the threats and
utilize them.

An online survey revealed that although respondents acknowledged that they had responsibility
to secure their accounts, their security measures were heavily related to passwords such as using
complicated password which is not suitable for phishing (Shay, Ion, Reeder, & Consolvo, 2014).
No matter how complex password is, phishers can uncover it once the user is deceived by a
phishing scam and fills in the password on a fake website.

People tend to determine the legitimacy of websites based on their design and style, and whether
the website contains high-quality images and numerous animations, all of which can be easily
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replicated by attackers (Aburrous et al., 2010; Downs et al., 2007). These findings are in
agreement with some of the findings by Parsons et al. (2016): people are heavily influenced by
visual presentation when they make decisions on the genuineness of an email. Even some
security experts fell for visual deceptions used in phishing attacks (Aburrous et al., 2010).
Dhamija, Tygar, and Hearst (2006) conducted user studies to investigate how phishing websites
hook users, and their work illustrated that most participants misunderstood security indicators
and were deceived by professional-looking phishing webpages. Phishers adopts typejacking
attacks, which substitutes some letters in the legitimate URLs, but the modified URLs still look
quite similar to the legitimate ones (e.g. www.yaho0.com, www.paypai.com, www.paypa1.com,
www.faceb00k.com, www.facelook.com, www.amazonn.com). Sometimes, phishers take
advantage of non-ASCII UNICODE characters in domain names. For the webpages, phishers
mimic the content of legitimate sites.

In order for users not to judge a legitimacy of content by its seemingly legitimate-looking
elements, organizations and corporations across industries including private companies (e.g.
eBay, PayPal, HSBC, Chase), government agencies, universities started to provide users with
anti-phishing tutorials. In general, the training materials include warnings against phishing
showing some of the previous phishing attempts and checklists such as clues in emails, websites,
and other possible media for users to distinguish phishing contents from legitimate ones. They
also highlight necessary actions to users after phished, for instance, immediately calling to the
security office of the organization, reporting the phishing email to the corresponding email of the
organization.
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Kumaraguru, Sheng, Acquisti, Cranor, and Hong (2010) performed a user study to determine the
efficiency of 4 online anti-phishing training instructions with 28 non-computer experts. They
divided them into two groups and asked the two groups to determine 10 webpages consisting of
5 phishing pages and 5 legitimate pages. After the initial study, one of the groups read training
materials, and the other group did not read. The results showed that the total correctness of
trained group increased statically significantly, but the other group’s change was not significant.
2.4.6.2 Training Methods
As mentioned in the preceding section, financial organizations and e-commerce enterprises
provide users with online training materials to avoid suspicious attempts. The tips and
instructions are provided in the organization’s website or by emails, and it has been shown that if
users actually read the online tutorials, it helps mitigate users’ phishing susceptibility. However,
it is hard to expect that users actively search for online training materials and read them.

In a way of assessing users’ phishing susceptibility by themselves, online phishing IQ testers
have been published, such as MailFrontier, Sonicwall. Phishing IQ testers send screen shots of
phishing emails to test-takers, and the users determine whether it is phishing or legitimate.
Phishing IQ testing is more interactive with users than online tips; however, the score of the test
might not be reliable since the test environment makes people more conscious of phishing, and
the test solely accelerated users’ fear which led to the increase in false positive rates (Anandpara,
Dingman, Jakobsson, Liu, & Roinestad, 2007).

Another way of educating people is to deliver anti-phishing materials in classroom sessions
(Robila & Ragucci, 2006). Classroom sessions are advantageous in that instructors test
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participants’ phishing knowledge and teach them anti-phishing techniques in person; however,
people are not likely to vigorously participate in the sessions, as well as training a number of
participants in a classroom could be a challenging task.

Embedded training (a.k.a. training intervention) refers to supplying training materials after a user
falls for a simulated phishing email during his or her normal use of email. When a user gets
phished, the user realizes that his or her ability is not capable enough to resist the phishing
attack, and the perception motivates the user to willingly learn training materials. Embedded
training enhanced user’s phishing detection ability more effectively than sending training
materials by separate email (Kumaraguru, 2009; Kumaraguru, Rhee, Acquisti, et al., 2007;
Kumaraguru, Rhee, Sheng, et al., 2007; Kumaraguru, Sheng, Acquisti, Cranor, & Hong, 2008).
A role-play experiment with 36 subjects (Alnajim & Munro, 2009) represented that those who
received anti-phishing instructions right after they hit phishing URLs could detect phishing
webpages better than those who received anti-phishing tips by separate emails.

Games have been known as efficient educational approaches in that game-based learning has an
advantage of storytelling and provides a fun, interactive, and competitive environment where
players are naturally involved and use critical thinking to solve problems (Amory & Seagram,
2003), and several studies have proposed anti-phishing educational games. Anti-Phishing Phil is
an online interactive anti-phishing educational game (Sheng et al., 2007). Specifically, it was
intended to train users to discriminate phishing webpages from legitimate ones by providing tips
(e.g., characteristics of phishing URLs, locations of cues in web browsers, legitimacy of sites
using search engines) during the game play. 14 participants joined the experiment to compare the
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effectiveness of Anti-Phishing Phil with two reading materials (existing online training tutorial
and Anti-Phishing Phil’s written tutorial). The results showed that participants trained by AntiPhishing Phil game detected phishing websites better than the others who read the tutorials. A
role-play experiment with 64 participants demonstrated that a trained group by Anti-Phishing
Phil was less credulous of phishing emails than a non-trained group, and the game training group
showed increased working memory which helps decrease phishing susceptibility (Mayhorn &
Nyeste, 2012). As people’s mobile usage increases, games to train users to detect phishing URLs
were developed in mobile platform to elevate users’ accessibility to the game (Arachchilage &
Cole, 2011; Canova, Volkamer, Bergmann, & Borza, 2014).

Baslyman and Chiasson (2016) developed a tabletop board game to increase user phishing
awareness and deliver anti-phishing knowledge. Two to four players can join the game at a time,
and the players in turn perform a required task as described in their online shopping list provided
in the beginning of the game. Whether they make an appropriate decision or fall for a scam, they
receive feedback on their action. The game engaged users actively in learning the materials by
leading them to share and discuss their knowledge and experiences with other players and
stimulating the sense of competition among them.

Sun, Kuo, Hou, and Yu-Yan (2017) explored trainees’ behavior patterns and achievement in an
anti-phishing education game designed for phishing on SNS. Their findings illustrated that
learners acquired anti-phishing knowledge from their mistakes during the test. The participants
found solutions through discussion with peers, reading materials, verification of their knowledge,
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repeating challenges until they succeed. The authors suggested that the level of difficulty in antiphishing training games be tunable based on the learner’s achievement while playing the games.
2.4.6.3 Training Limitations
Most financial enterprises and institutions exposed to phishing threats provide anti-phishing tips
on their websites. Online tips help reduce the occurrence of potential incidents, yet the tips are
inadequate to protect users against phishing attacks (Alnajim & Munro, 2008), and tutorials of
anti-phishing toolbars are not effective to educate users how to use the applications (Li et al.,
2014). The tips might not contain enough details (e.g., lack of information on verifying
legitimate websites) or be outdated to detect fast-paced phishing attacks, and the instructions
could not be quite understandable for users.

Embedded training showed its effectiveness in phishing awareness; however, Caputo, Pfleeger,
Freeman, and Johnson (2014) explored the efficiency of embedded training in employees’
recognition of spear phishing in a real-world environment, and their results showed that the
training did not significantly affect the employees’ recognition of spear phishing emails.
Although the participants believed that the embedded training was effective, they did not pay
close attention to the given materials of training pages, which implies that they were not actually
educated by the training. The used training materials contained too much text instructions that
might be ignored by the trainees who are not willing to consume considerable time to read the
instructions.

Along with effectively delivering training materials, another important aspect of training system
is to ensure that trainees hold the knowledge for as long a period of time as possible. According
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to Caputo et al. (2014), the employees were not able to recall the knowledge from the training in
the real world due to a limited number of trainings.

The current anti-phishing education programs emphasize the importance on the observation of
security indicators and cues and supply how to utilize the signals. Unfortunately, Kirlappos and
Sasse (2012) asserted that users largely ignore the indicators since they do not trust the signals
and still tend to rely on their assumptions and previous experiences to deal with security issues
even after security education, which can be easily exploited by scammers.

The main difficulty of user education is attributed to considering security as a secondary task for
users (Aburrous et al., 2010; Görling, 2006). Employees would rather pay for security than
managing security concerns by themselves to achieve their primary tasks. Görling (2006) argued
that user education did not go beyond raising users’ security consciousness, and people still
made unsecure behaviors even after education as well as user education increased the level of
false positives. Not only the cost of victimization by phishing is enormous, but also the
consequence of dumping important genuine messages could be devastating for users. He also
mentioned that social engineering attacks could not be avoided by user education due to
sophisticated techniques used in such attacks.

Another difficulty of human side defense is humans’ unpredictable behaviors. In an organization,
employees’ bad behaviors can affect the other employees’ judgement on phishing, namely
unintentional activities by some employees such as sending unsolicited massive emails for the
efficiency could harm their organizations (Epstein, 2014). For instance, when non-technical
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people (e.g., HR, payroll, facilities) internally send phishing-looking messages (e.g., securityrelated emails, award emails) which are real legitimate, the recipients might struggle with
determining the messages' legitimacy. As the employees are informed that those kinds of
messages are genuine repeatedly, they will lower their security guard, and eventually they will be
less vigilant against phishing threats.

Training users, especially non-technical people, to acquire the required technical knowledge is
difficult given that the trends of phishing schemes are fast-paced. If one employee does not
recognize a phishing message and hands over credential information to the adversary, the entire
organization to which the employee belongs can be compromised.

Although educational approaches have the difficulties in training users and pose side effects, user
education programs have somewhat decreased users’ phishing susceptibility and need to be
further developed along with technical defenses until we find an optimal solution for phishing
threats. Considering tremendous human efforts and cost of education, it is still ideal to delegate
security concerns to technical defense. Unfortunately, the existing technical solutions are not
adequate to eradicate phishing threats, and this project suggests a method to alleviate the
technical vulnerability to phishing scams.

2.5

Ontology

2.5.1

Definition

According to the Gruber’s definition, “an ontology is an explicit specification of
conceptualization,” and it abstracts and simplifies our view of world (Gruber, 1993). The term
ontology originated from philosophy, in which ontology was introduced in a way to
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systematically explain existence. For knowledge-based systems, the set of objects and their
relations need to be clearly declared for what exists. Terms and specifications for an ontology
can vary depending on developers. Considering the difficulties of reusability, portability and
compatibility, agreements on how to define concepts and relations for each domain are needed
and conventions of implementation are required.

The construction of a knowledge base is expensive and difficult, and the lack of means to
interoperability among heterogeneous systems or domains hinders researchers from reusing
developed knowledge bases. To improve insufficiency of shareability (reuse of knowledge bases),
a canonical form for declarative knowledge needs to be specified so that ontology builders can
comply with the same commitments as well as it is required to define common ontologies that
contain vocabularies of representational terms such as classes, properties, and one can build a
knowledge base by instantiating domain-specific information based on these shared concepts and
relations (Gruber, 1993).

Guarino refined Gruber’s definition of ontology by differentiating between an ontology and a
conceptualization (Guarino, 1998; Guarino, Oberle, & Staab, 2009). Guarino considered an
ontology as a set of logical axioms designed to deal with the intended meaning of vocabulary.
The set of logical axioms indicates ontological commitments by which an ontology approximates
a conceptualization. We want to design a model for a specific world. Our world is a set of
infinite world states, and we try to find a best model among the ordered world states from time
for simplicity. Figure 2.4 illustrates between language, conceptualization, ontological
commitment, and ontology.
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Figure 2.4 The relationships between phenomena occurring in reality, their perception (at
different times), their abstracted conceptualization, the language used to talk about such
conceptualization, its intended models, and an ontology (Guarino, Oberle, & Staab, 2009)

The intended model L exists inside an ontology when it was constructed in accordance with
commitments. It was stressed that an ontology is language-dependent, and a conceptualization is
language-independent. In general, ontologies are regarded as language-independent; however,
Guarino differentiated ontologies from conceptualization, and specifications in an ontology are
written in a human-readable language (e.g., English, Korean). In this sense, Guarino asserted that
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an ontology depended on a specific language. Ontology sharing and integration can be impeded
by the language difference between ontologies.

Ontology is a description of our world including the knowledge about the things in the world. In
practice, an ontology model is designed for a specific domain and is acquired by human experts
for the domains of interest (Taylor, Hempelmann, & Raskin, 2010). Knowledge engineers
leverage computational ontologies as a means to formally build the structure of a system in
which relevant entities and relations observed in a specific domain or world for their purposes.

Ontology is organized as a set of concepts which are semantically related by one or more
properties (Nirenburg & Raskin, 2004). Specifically, concepts have hierarchical relations, and
they are connected by properties, which are either attributes of concepts or relations among
concepts. In other words, a concept consists of one or more properties with their values at least
partially specified (Nirenburg & Raskin, 2004). Concepts are maintained in a taxonomy which
defines the hierarchical relations between concepts in terms of their semantical relations.
Properties appear in the ontology in two guises, as defined types of concepts in the property
branch and as slots in the definitions of objects and events. Concepts can be considered frames,
and properties are the slots to be filled in the frames. Table 2.2 shows the property AGENT of the
concept TEACH. The facet of the property defines the range of the property. The DEFAULT facet is
used when it is highly likely. People usually think adults teach students. The
a broader range than
SEM.

DEFAULT,

and the

RELAXABLE-TO

facet provides

includes even broader concepts than the

Fillers are values connected by the property. The concept

concept ADULT, HUMAN, and ANIMATE.

SEM

TEACH

can be connected to the
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Table 2.2 The AGENT property of the concept TEACH
Property Name

AGENT

Facet

Filler

DEFAULT

ADULT

SEM

HUMAN

RELAXABLE-TO

ANIMATE

Computational semantics deals with the meanings of words and sentences residing in texts, and
largely two main approaches exist: statistical method, and (rule-based) ontological method.
Statistical machine learning approaches have been prevalent in the engineering semantics field
due to relatively its low time consumption for implementation and producing some promising
results; however, semantics is a discipline to handle meanings of natural languages, and
meanings should be handled in a linguistic semantics processing way as humans do instead of
finding them based on the best probabilities (Raskin, Hempelmann, & Taylor, 2010). Unlike
statistical approaches that ignore reasoning by which human process natural language
information, ontological semantics approaches aim to create a computational model based on
human understanding.

When building an ontology, concepts are selected to be representative of terms and contain
properties that define relations of concepts. It is pivotal to define proper concepts in a domain. In
general, the smaller number of concepts, the better the ontology model for the purpose fits the
world if and only if the model is enough for the complete description of the world. Of course, the
level of granularity depends on the purpose of an application. There exists a tradeoff between the
simplicity of knowledge formulation and ease of its manipulation. For the same world, different
versions of ontologies can exist, and although they are essentially the same ontology, ontology
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engineers assign discrete values among properties and decide the depth of granularity depending
on the problems and the engineers’ points of views (Nirenburg & Raskin, 2004).
2.5.2

Existing Ontologies

Semantical relations among concepts represent the connections of concepts as humans view the
world with the knowledge of things in the world. WordNet is a well-known and widely used
knowledge resource in natural language processing (Miller, 1995). Some people in
computational semantics community argue that WordNet is considered as an ontology in that
WordNet relates words in terms of lexical-semantic definitions (literal meaning). Specifically,
WordNet combines words in a so-called synonym set based on their dictionary definition, and
further connects words to their lexical related words such as hyponym, hypernym, meronym, etc.
Simply, WordNet can be regarded as a combination of dictionary and thesaurus. If a semantic
relation is defined as lexical definition relatedness, then WordNet might seem to be an ontology.
On the other hand, when an ontology is used to describe a specific domain of our world,
WordNet reveal limitations to be a best model of the world due to the fact that WordNet does not
provide semantical relations beyond the lexical relations among entities in the world. For
instance, WordNet represents the concept

CAR

with its synonyms auto, automobile, motorcar,

etc., its hyponym bus, cab, etc., and other words related to lexical meanings. In our world, the
concept

CAR

has to be interconnected with semantically related other concepts to reflect real-

world cars. Humans activate cars, cars are run by gas, and cars have risks of traffic accidents. In
other words, in an ontology concepts should have relations with other concepts semantically. A
CAT

(concept) is able to

EAT

(concept)

FOOD

(concept), rather than it simply belongs to

FELINE.

Another limitation of WordNet would be too fine-grain sized terms. Although the grain size of
senses depends on applications, in most cases, too specific distinctions in word senses increase

47
computational complexity for word sense disambiguation as defined meanings are much
overlapped.

In the medical environments, there exists a well-known ontological knowledge base to process
medical texts. The Unified Medical Language System (UMLS) is a repository of biomedical
vocabularies developed by the US National Library of Medicine (Bodenreider, 2004). UMLS
contains a vast list of medical terms (over 2.5 million) for its concepts as well as 12 million
relations within the concepts. UMLS aims to provide an effective source for machine readable
information retrieval by integrating variants of a term and presenting standard format for
distributing terminologies.

UMLS is composed of three main components: the Metathesaurus that is a repository of interrelated medical concepts, the Semantic Network that categorizes each Metathesaurus concept,
and lexical resources including SPECIALIST lexicon that contains common English words and
many biomedical vocabulary. MetaMap is a program that maps medical text to concepts in the
UMLS Metathesaurus (Aronson, 2001, 2006; Aronson & Lang, 2010). The process of MetaMap
follows five steps: lexical and syntactic analysis, variant generation, candidate identification,
mapping construction, and word sense disambiguation. Lexical and syntactic analysis tokenizes a
given text into phrase units. Variants generator finds variants of a phrase word such as synonyms,
derivational variants. In the candidate identification phase, all Metathesaurus strings containing
at least one of the variants (called candidate set) are first obtained, and then are ordered by
computed match score between each candidate’ words and the phrase words. The best candidate
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for each phrase’ word becomes a part of final mapping construction. Figure 2.5 shows the
candidate set for the given phrase “obstructive sleep apnea.”

Figure 2.5 The retrieved concept from the “obstructive sleep apnea” (Aronson & Lang, 2010)

UMLS has been widely adopted to find clinical concepts in naturally expressed medical texts in
medical domain (Friedman, Shagina, Lussier, & Hripcsak, 2004; Harkema, Dowling, Thornblade,
& Chapman, 2009; Hazlehurst, Frost, Sittig, & Stevens, 2005). UMLS is a similar type of
WordNet. The difference between them is that WordNet finds the synonym sets of a word based
on its literal meaning, but UMLS cluster words, especially biomedical vocabulary, by their
concepts which indicate the same medical symptom or disease or medical process. UMLS is a
useful repository for conceptualization of medical terminology; however, the relations among
concepts are still weak, and thus the meaning extraction of medical text cannot be done solely on
UMLS.
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2.5.3

Previous Ontological Phishing Detection

An ontological model is applicable to phishing domain as concepts (e.g., word sense classes) and
their relations derived from contents of phishing messages might be distinguishable features.
Several papers have proposed ontology-based approaches to find and utilize semantic features
for phishing detection.

Kerremans, Tang, Temmerman, and Zhao (2005) developed an ontology-based knowledge
engineering system to detect email scams such as phishing. The ontological model consists of
concepts (e.g., addressee, account) and their relations (e.g., open) that are defined by possible
scenarios of a specific fraud type, and the semantic model is used to identify corresponding
syntactic patterns to the concepts in fraud emails.

Zhang et al. (2012) designed phishing domain ontology in an attempt to detect fake webpages.
They used words found in phishing pages as concepts and set up rules for relationships among
the concepts. The relationships define concepts’ hyponym concepts or hypernym concepts. The
phishing detection algorithm compared concepts and their relationships in a new webpage with
concepts and their relationships in known phishing sites in a statistical way.

Tseng, Ku, Lee, Geng, and Wang (2013) proposed a frame-based phishing ontology. The
researchers focused on identifying URL obfuscation. They stored each webpage’s information
into a frame and used predefined knowledge frames, each of which contains a possible
obfuscating URL scenario. Based on the stored information in a frame, each knowledge frame
checks if the URL is violated with the conditions in the knowledge frame slots.
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Falk (2016) conducted experiments to examine that semantic information in the email text would
aid machine’s phishing classification performance. The author manually extracted semantic
representations from email body texts using partially implemented ontology and lexicon to use
them as features for ML classifiers. The results showed that ML algorithms fed by semantic
representation features outperformed ML algorithms fed by lexical unigram features.
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METHODOLOGY

This dissertation proposes an ontological semantics-based phishing detection approach. The
proposed methodology suggests that machines detect phishing threats based on semantic analysis
of the email body texts that goes beyond superficial feature comparison of texts. Specifically, the
purpose of this approach is to investigate the effectiveness of conceptualization for lexical
features, which was hypothesized to reduce vulnerability to variance in superficial characteristics.

The suggested methodology implements a phishing ontology used to extract semantic features
from emails. The features will be utilized to train supervised ML algorithms for phishing email
detection. This research adopts three well known supervised ML algorithms: Logistic Regression
(LR), Support Vector Machine (SVM), and Random Forest (RF). ML classifiers are trained for
binary classification task that labels emails as either legitimate or phishing.

3.1

Ontological Semantics Technology

The approach leverages Ontological Semantics Technology (OST) to build an ontology suitable
for phishing detection. OST is an ontological semantics-based system that handles semantic
processing for natural languages (Hempelmann, Taylor, & Raskin, 2010). The core component
of OST is the language-independent ontology that contains a set of concepts (events, objects) in a
hierarchical structure, and each concept has a set of properties (slots, facets, and fillers) including
a subsumption and mereological (part-whole) properties (Raskin et al., 2010). In ontology,
largely,

ALL

(root concept) exists at the top of the concept hierarchy, and

(“free-standing”) are under

ALL,

and sub-concepts of

EVENT

and

OBJECT

EVENT

and

OBJECT

are inter-connected by
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properties (“bound”) (Nirenburg & Raskin, 2004). The overall structure of ontology is
represented as a graph form where nodes and edges denote concepts and properties respectively.

Another principal element of OST is a lexicon, which is a language dependent resource. A
lexicon is a set of words of a particular natural language, each of which contains knowledge of
its usage for the general purposes or domain-specific purposes (Hirst, 2009). Each of the words
(lexemes) contains a number of senses. Each sense is described in terms of its part-of-speech and
semantic structure – a mapping to the ontological concept with corresponding relations. A
syntactic structure – typical relationships of this sense with others in a sentence – is added
whenever it is beneficial for the sense definition.

Lexeme senses in the lexicon contain morphological information. Morphology handles word
variants that have the same meaning but different lexical forms. A morph is a minimal
meaningful unit (Raskin & Weiser, 1987). A word is composed of more than one morph, and the
meaning of the word is the sum of morph(s) meanings. Largely, morphs are categorized into
lexical morphs or grammatical morphs. The lexical morphs indicate objects, actions, qualities,
and other entities of the real world (e.g. cat, eat, mouse, link, etc.). The grammatical morphs do
not stand alone, and they only modify the meanings of the lexical morphs by adding a certain
component to them such as affix (e.g. un-, -d, -s, etc.). The morphology module in the OST
handles grammatical morphs of words to avoid multiple lexical entries for word variants (e.g.
different forms of verb tense, singular and plural form of nouns) of the same word in the lexicon.
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In ontological semantics, the notion of instantiation is crucial. For the instantiation, a lexicon
containing language-dependent words per each language is required to be anchored in the
ontological concepts. Each sense of a lexical is anchored in a concept in the ontology per each
meaning, which, in turn, is mapped to a possible syntactic structure of this lexeme (Hempelmann
et al., 2010).

The creation of lexicon of a specific language such as English requires a language knowledge
resource (specification) for reference such as a dictionary. However, it is not effective to direcly
reflect a dictionary to a lexicon since dictionaries tend to define word meanings in a very fine
grain size. Namely, some meanings are too simliar to be distinguishable or useful for the
purposes of application, which increases a computational complexicity as well as ambiguity of
meanings. The matter of word sense granularity depends on problems to be solved in a specific
world (application) (Navigli, 2009).

OST processor extracts meanings of texts and displays the representations in a graph form. When
a text is entered into OST processor, each sense of each lexeme is mapped to a concept, as
indicated by the lexicon. OST finds the shortest path in a graph for senses of lexemes in a text
(usually a sentence), favoring the relationships specified in the lexicon and taking into account
relationships permitted by the ontology. The resulting graph is referred to as Text Meaning
Representation (TMR) or conceptual representation text.

Figure 3.1 depicts the overall process of OST.
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Figure 3.1 Ontological Semantic Process (Raskin, Taylor, & Hempelmann, 2013)

The purpose of introducing ontology to phishing domain includes the conceptualization & Word
Sense Disambiguation (WSD) and knowledge representation using TMRs. The conceptualization
groups words based on their meaning. Given that the intention of phishing attacks is almost
identical -- namely, to obtain private information --, it is reasonable to assume that phishing
emails contain words with analogous meanings. For instance, ID, password, profile, and SSN can
belong to PRIVATE-INFORMATION concept.

A number of words frequently appear in both legitimate and phishing emails. However, the
meaning of the word can differ depending on the context. The early work demonstrated that
verbs frequently appearing in both legitimate and phishing emails were accompanied by different
arguments between phishing and legitimate (Park & Taylor, 2015). Table 3.1 demonstrates the

55
most frequent object of the verb confirm among three datasets: Nazario phishing corpus
(collected in 2005), APWG phishing corpus (collected in 2015), and Enron legitimate corpus.

Table 3.1 The most frequent object of the verb confirm (Park & Taylor, 2015)
Verb

Corpus
Phishing
Nazario

confirm

Phishing
APWG
Legitimate
Enron

The most frequent object (percentage) & example
identity (31.35%)
E.g. “Please confirm your identity here.”
information (25.08%)
E.g. “We need to confirm your account information.”
meeting (18%)
E.g. “Phillip, This message is to confirm our meeting with you on.”

The three objects are different. However, two objects of the phishing corpora indicate a private
information object; on the other hand, the object meeting represents a social event which is
different from the other two objects. Namely, the three different objects can be categorized into
two concept classes from the semantic point of view. Different arguments lead to different senses
of verbs. For instance, the meaning of the verb update in the sentence “Could you update me on
any information you have acquired?” is different from the meaning in the sentence “If you do
not update your information within 72 hours, we will limit it.” The meaning of the verb update is
INFORM

in the first sentence and is

UPDATE-INFORMATION

in the second one. The finding reveals

that the intention of phishing does not change over time, and thus, it is expected that clustering
words in semantic domains can create distinguishable features between phishing and legitimate
emails.
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TMRs are human- and machine-readable knowledge representations, and they enable humans to
verify connections of word meanings. Figure 3.2, 3.3 show a fragment of a TMR of a sentence
from a phishing email and a legitimate email respectively.

Figure 3.2 A fragment of a TMR of “you might enter your Twitter password”

Figure 3.3 A fragment of a TMR of “you will enter the building on the 4th floor”
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3.2

Datasets

Phishing detection mechanisms based on supervised ML typically have a dataset that consists of
two parts: legitimate corpus and phishing corpus. Legitimate corpus contains a collection of
innocuous emails, and phishing corpus contains phishing emails generally obtained from a
recognized source.

This research employed a collection of phishing emails from the phishing archive of APWG.
APWG collects suspicious emails reported by users from around the world and releases the
reported emails on a monthly basis. The archive contains data from June 2006, and the volume of
data is around 50,000 emails per month. The phishing emails forwarded to APWG from January
2017 to March 2017 are used for ML training data, and the emails on September 2017 are used
for ML test data.

The legitimate part of the dataset is created by combining two publicly available datasets: Enron
emails 3 and Jeff Bush’s emails 4 . The Enron Corporation was an American energy company.
After the Enron scandal in 2001, the company’s internal email messages were revealed
(published) and have been widely used for academic researches. Politician Jeff Bush’s emails
became publicly accessible after the email scandal. Enron corpus contains 517,424 emails, and
Jeb Bush email corpus contains 59,208 emails. The training and test data for ML classifiers are
extracted from the legitimate corpora separately. Table 3.2 shows the total size of datasets, and
the actual size of the datasets for the experiments is reduced after the preprocessing steps. The
updated sizes are described in the following section.

3
4

https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~enron/
https://americanbridgepac.org/jeb-bushs-gubernatorial-email-archive/
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Table 3.2 The total size of datasets
Email corpus

Number of Emails

APWG Jan 2017

56,709

APWG Feb 2017

48,004

APWG Mar 2017

55,517

APWG Sep 2017

51,008

Enron

517,424

Jeb Bush

59,208

Phishing

Legitimate

3.3

Data Preprocessing

This section describes the preprocessing of emails to generate input data for OST. The data
preprocessing begins with filtering out duplicate emails. The dataset contains a numerous
number of duplicate emails. The reasons for it differ in the legitimate and phishing corpora. The
legitimate corpus, Enron email dataset and Jeff Bush’s email dataset, are users’ email accounts.
When an email is sent, the message is stored in the sender’s sent box and the recipient’s inbox,
thus creating duplicates. Also, an email can be sent to multiple recipients in an organization such
as notices. APWG datasets contain duplicate emails since users report the same phishing
messages due to the fact that phishers send out the same phishing emails to numerous email
addresses. Sometimes, users receive the same phishing messages repeatedly. This project intends
to supply various phishing scenarios to a machine which will be learned to catch phishing emails
in different forms, and duplicates messages may hinder a machine from it. Thus, the duplicate
messages are removed. Here, the messages are regarded as duplicates if they have the same
subject and body text.
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The current research only considers emails written in English. Thus, non-English emails are
excluded. First, charsets in emails are intuitive clues to identify non-English emails. For instance,
BIG5, BIG5-HKSCS charsets indicate emails written in Chinese, Shift_JIS indicates emails
written in Japanese, and ISO-2022-KR indicates emails written in Korean. Table 3.3 shows the
charsets to eliminate non-English emails.
Table 3.3 The charsets to eliminate non-English emails
Language

Charset

Chinese

"BIG5," "BIG5-HKSCS," "GB2312," "GBK," "GB18030," "EUC-CN,"
"HZ-GB-2312," "ISO-2022-CN”

Japanese

"ISO-2022-JP," "EUC-JP," "Shift_JIS," "x-sjis"

Korean

"ISO-2022-KR," "KSC-5601," "EIC-KR," "EUC-KR"

Arabic

"ISO-8859-6," "WINDOWS-1256," "X-MAC-ARABIC"

Using solely email charsets has limitations to rule out non-English texts. For example, UTF-8 is
one of the most popular character sets, and the Unicode-based encoding supports a number of
languages. To further catch non-English texts, the language detection tool called LanguageTool
(v. 3.4) is used. LanguageTool supports several languages including English, and it recognizes a
language of text based on its built-in grammatical rules. The email texts (subject and body part)
are extracted by using JavaMail (v. 1.4.7), and then HTML tags in the extracted text are removed
using Jsoup (Java HTML parser – v. 1.8.1). Hyperlinks and email addresses are removed as well
since they often cause syntactic parsing errors. Then, the texts are segmented by a sentence
boundary.

In the lexicon, each lexeme has more than one syntactic structure and semantic structure, and the
syntactic components are inserted into its semantic elements to find a corresponding concept. It
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requires tremendous time and human endeavor to manually create syntactic structures. To reduce
the lexicon creation time consumption and increase effectiveness, this project adopts an existing
syntactic parser – Stanford typed dependency parser (De Marneffe & Manning, 2008a). The
Stanford typed dependencies representation (SD) has an aim to provide a description of
grammatical relations in a sentence. The basic unit of SD is a binary relation between two words,
and SD represents the set of binary relations in a sentence. Total 56 grammatical relations are
used in SD, and they are arranged in a hierarchy. A grammatical relation holds between a
governor (also known as a head) and a dependent. The specific detail of grammatical relations is
described in (De Marneffe & Manning, 2008b). For instance, the SD of the sentence “Could you
update me on any information you have acquired?” is as follows.

aux (update-3, Could-1)
nsubj (update-3, you-2)
root (ROOT-0, update-3)
dobj (update-3, me-4)
case (information-7, on-5)
det (information-7, any-6)
nmod (update-3, information-7)
nsubj (acquired-10, you-8)
aux (acquired-10, have-9)
acl:relcl (information-7, acquired-10)

The format of a relation is the_name_of_grammatical_relation(governor, dependent). The
number next to a governor or a dependent is simply the order in the sentence. nsubj(update-3,
you-2) indicates that you is the nominal subject of the verb update, and dobj(update-3, me-4)
means that me is the direct object of update.
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Stanford CoreNLP library (v. 3.9.1) was used to tag verbs and their syntactic dependents
(Manning et al., 2014). For the experiments in this research, double and triple relations in a
sentence are analyzed. Specifically, the considered components in a sentence are initiators of
actions (verbs) and targets of the actions. Verbs are identified by Penn Treebank part-of-speech
tags, and the verb tags include VB (verb, base form), VBD (verb, past tense), VBG (verb,
gerund), VBN (verb, past participle), VBP (verb, non 3rd person singular present), and VBZ
(verb, 3rd person singular present). The considered dependents of verb include ‘nominal subject’,
‘agent’, ‘controlling nominal subject’, ‘direct object’, ‘passive nominal subject’, ‘controlling
nominal passive subject’. Table 3.4 shows an example of each dependent.
Table 3.4 The dependent tag with example
Dependent (tag)

Example
"Clinton defeated Dole"

NOMINAL_SUBJECT (nsubj)

→ nsubj(defeated, Clinton)
"The man has been killed by the police"

AGENT (nmod:agent)

CONTROLLING_NOMINAL_SUBJECT
(nsubj:xsubj)

→ nmod:agent(killed, police)
"I have a grandson who want to go to college"
→ nsubj:xsubj(go, grandson)
"Your PayPal ID was used to sign in to PayPal
via a web browser"
→ nsubj:xsubj(sign, ID)
"We’ll send you money"

DIRECT_OBJECT (dobj)

→ dobj(send, money)
"Dole was defeated by Clinton"

NOMINAL_PASSIVE_SUBJECT (nsubjpass)

CONTROLLING_NOMINAL_PASSIVE_SUBJECT
(nsubjpass:xsubj)

→ nsubjpass(defeated, Dole)
"Tom likes to be photographed"
→ nsubjpass:xsubj(photographed, Tom)
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Verbs can have different meaning when they are used as phrasal verbs. For instance, the phrasal
verb give up means different from the verb give. The parser detects phrasal verb particles in a
sentence if exists, and the pair of verb and particle is used to define a sense of verb in lexicon.
The meaning of word can be further specified or altered when it is followed by another lexical
element called compound modifier. For example, the word court can mean several different
things such as building for legal proceedings, sports court, or garden of building. If it is used
with the compound modifier federal, then the meaning of court is narrowed down to legal court.
The word conditioner by itself has a completely different meaning from the compound word air
conditioner. Possessive modifiers are another important dependency for specification of word
senses. The word information can be used for any informative object. If the word is followed by
the personal possessive modifier such as your, then it infers PRIVATE-INFORMATION. The corpora
contain numerous proper nouns, and it is a time-consuming task to manually define all the
pronouns. To effectively handle proper nouns, Named Entity Recognizer (NER) in the Stanford
library is utilized to identify proper nouns (e.g., Smith – PERSON, Germany – LOCATION,
PG&E - ORGANIZATION), and the named entity tags are defined as concepts in the ontology.

Texts often contain typos, and the parser mistakenly tags broken words as verbs. Ideally, all
verbs need to exist in English dictionary. To remove incorrect verbs, WordNet (Miller, 1995)
dictionary is used to look up the tagged verb in the dictionary. Dependents are not validated
using the dictionary since compound words and proper nouns may not be registered in the
dictionary. Lexical entries in the OST lexicon have a word base form, which is a lemma of word.
Therefore, all words are transformed into lemmas.
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Figure 3.4 describes the overview of preprocessing the dataset.

Figure 3.4 Data Preprocessing steps
3.4

Phishing Ontology Construction

Both ontology and lexicon are augmented for the phishing domain. The extracted tokens (verbs
and dependents according to the parser) in the prior phase become resources for phishing
ontology construction. The ontology construction is composed of three parts: lexical entry
creation, defining concepts and properties, and TMR generation. Examination of all the tokens
entails huge labor costs, and therefore it is essential (reasonable and inevitable) to find an
appropriate range of words to be analyzed that are expected to generate discrete concepts
between legitimate and phishing emails.
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3.4.1

Verb Selection

This research has interests in words that cause significant action requests appearing in both
legitimate and phishing emails, and in general a verb in a sentence starts an action request. Verbs
have lexical dependents in a sentence, and the combination of a verb and its dependents can
convey different requests. One of the goals of this study is to examine how verbs act differently
between legitimate and phishing emails based on their relations with the dependents.

To find the most significant verbs, all verbs from legitimate and phishing dataset are extracted,
and they are ranked by normalized counts for each dataset. Then, they are re-ranked based on the
maximum normalized count between legitimate and phishing. Among the top 100 ranked verbs, I
manually examined dependents of verbs taking into consideration whether a verb has different
dependents in terms of their concepts between phishing and legitimate emails, and 50 verbs were
selected. The number 50 is opportunistic. One of the assumptions is that each of such significant
verbs should have different collection of arguments in both datasets due to the nature of the
email request. This work requires human effort due to the fact that literal difference does not
always comply with meaning difference. For instance, the verb change can have password and
passcode as an object. The lexical similarity between password and passcode is low, but their
meaning is identical.

The selected 50 verbs are as follows:
access, activate, approve, attach, bring, build, buy, change, check, choose, click, complete,
confirm, consider, create, deliver, deposit, earn, enter, file, find, give, kill, lose, make, open, pay,
protect, provide, raise, receive, reconfirm, reduce, register, release, remove, review, save, select,
send, set, share, sign, submit, transfer, update, use, verify, visit, win.
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3.4.2

Conceptualization with WSD

Conceptualization of words is the process of mapping lexical entries to their meanings. This
disambiguates word senses and groups words with their synonyms. Lexemes (words) have more
than one sense, and it is crucial to define proper word senses to achieve WSD. There exist some
lookup sources for word senses. Table 3.5 shows the number of senses of the selected verbs from
the four lexical databases: FrameNet (Baker, Fillmore, & Lowe, 1998), VerbNet (Schuler, 2005),
WordNet (Miller, 1995), BabelNet (Navigli & Ponzetto, 2012).

Table 3.5 The number of senses from the lexical databases
Lexical DB
FrameNet

VerbNet

WordNet

BabelNet

access

1

2

2

2

activate

1

4

5

5

approve

2

2

2

2

attach

2

3

5

6

bring

12

9

11

11

build

1

6

10

12

buy

2

7

5

5

change

6

4

10

10

check

3

12

25

25

choose

1

3

3

3

click

4

7

7

7

complete

1

3

5

6

confirm

5

4

5

5

consider

2

4

9

9

create

3

3

6

6

deliver

1

6

12

13

deposit

1

2

3

3

earn

1

2

2

3

enter

4

4

9

9

Verb
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file

5

4

5

6

find

11

6

16

17

give

14

12

44

44

kill

5

8

15

15

lose

10

8

10

11

make

20

16

49

49

open

3

7

11

11

pay

2

4

11

11

protect

1

2

2

3

provide

1

3

7

7

raise

4

10

27

27

receive

1

2

13

13

reconfirm

NA

NA

1

NA

reduce

2

6

20

20

register

2

5

10

11

release

2

3

10

12

remove

2

2

8

8

review

NA

3

5

5

save

1

4

11

11

select

1

1

1

2

send

3

4

8

8

set

21

12

25

25

share

3

3

5

5

sign

7

6

8

8

submit

2

4

10

10

transfer

3

3

9

9

update

NA

2

3

3

use

5

4

6

6

verify

2

1

4

5

visit

2

3

8

8

win

4

3

5

4

As can be seen in the table, the resources do not agree on the number of verb senses, which
implies that word sense granularity depends on the point of view of developers or the purpose of
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applications. This makes it difficult to determine which resource is the most suitable for this
project. More importantly, the grain size of word senses in the lexical databases are not quite
applicable to phishing domain. Fine-grained senses for some words might be inappropriate to
distinguish subtle difference in senses and categorize words into separate semantic concepts. On
the contrary, it might be necessary to split a word sense into different ones if the sense separation
is significant in a certain task. The proper granularity for word senses needs to be determined by
an empirical way for the purpose of this research. Another important factor of WSD is the
knowledge of a domain of interest. Instead of general word senses, tuned word senses based on
the knowledge, specific word senses in phishing emails, can help disambiguate words in a
domain-specific text. In other words, WSD needs to be designed for a purpose of the application
to maximize the usability and efficiency. It is desirable to define restricted domain word senses
for the purpose of this task. I used Ontological Semantic Technology as a tool for WSD. For this
task, I defined word senses with linguistic experts’ assistance. Table 3.6 shows the defined verb
senses in the lexicon. The lexicon definition and ontological terms were defined according to
methodology outlined in Nirenburg & Raskin (2004).
Table 3.6 The defined sense of the verbs
Verb

The number
of senses

Senses, mapped to OST concepts
(parentheses indicate phrasal verbs)

access

2

READ-INFORMATION, ENTER

activate

3

ACTIVATE, ACTIVATE-HUMAN

approve

2

AUTHORIZE, ACCEPT

attach

2

ATTACH, ATTACH-FILE

bring

5

BRING, BEGIN (bring-about), DECREASE (bring-down), MAKE-LIVE
(bring-to-life), RAISE (bring-up)

build

2

CREATE, BUILD-RELATIONSHIP

buy

2

BUY, BUY-OUT (buy-out)
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change

2

REPLACE, UPDATE-INFORMATION

check

3

ANALYZE, VERIFY, LOOK (check-out)

choose

2

SELECT, ELECT

click

2

CLICK, CLICK-PHYSICAL-OBJECT

complete

3

CREATE, RECORD-INFORMATION, END

confirm

2

AFFIRM, VERIFY

consider

2

ANALYZE, THINK

create

2

CREATE, FORM-GROUP

deliver

2

TRANSPORT-OBJECT, RELAY-INFORMATION

deposit

2

PUT-IN-SAFE-PLACE, TRANSFER-MONEY

earn

2

ACQUIRE-FINANCIAL-OBJECT, ACQUIRE

enter

3

RECORD-INFORMATION, ENTER, BEGIN

file

2

RECORD-INFORMATION, SUE

find

3

FIND-PHYSICAL-OBJECT, FIND-INFORMATION, JOB-HUNTING

give

3

GIVE, RELAY-INFORMATION, SUGGEST

kill

2

KILL, TREAT-DISEASE

lose

2

FAIL-TO-WIN, LOSE-PHYSICAL-OBJECT

make

7

ACQUIRE-FINANCIAL-OBJECT, CREATE, COMPREHEND (makesense), DECIDE (make-decision), CONTACT (make-call), PAY
(make-payment), USE (make-use)

open

3

OPEN, READ-INFORMATION, BEGIN

pay

3

PAY, ATTENTION (pay-attention), SOCIALIZE (pay-visit),

protect

2

PROTECT, SECURE-INFORMATION

provide

3

GIVE, RELAY-INFORMATION, SUGGEST

raise

3

RAISE, ACQUIRE-FINANCIAL-OBJECT, SUGGEST

receive

3

ACQUIRE, RELAY-INFORMATION, SUGGEST

reconfirm

2

AFFIRM, VERIFY

reduce

2

DECREASE, ECONOMIZE

register

2

RECORD-INFORMATION, REGISTER-SOCIAL-GROUP

release

4

RELEASE-MONEY, LIBERATE, ISSUE, TRANSPORT-OBJECT

remove

3

TAKE-AWAY, DISPLACE, REMOVE-INFORMATION

review

2

ANALYZE, VERIFY

save

3

PROTECT, DOWNLOAD, ECONOMIZE

select

2

SELECT, ELECT

send

3

TRANSPORT-OBJECT, TRANFER-MONEY, RELAY-INFORMATION
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set

2

DECIDE, CREATE (set-up), BEGIN (set-up)

share

3

GIVE, RELAY-INFORMATION, SUGGEST

sign

3

submit

2

TRANSFER-MONEY, RELAY-INFORMATION

transfer

3

DISPLACE, TRANSPORT-OBJECT, TRANSFER-MONEY

update

2

UPDATE-INFORMATION, INFORM

use

2

USE, USE-UP (use-up)

verify

2

AFFIRM, VERIFY

visit

2

SOCIALIZE, CLICK

win

3

ACQUIRE, ACQUIRE-FINANCIAL-OBJECT, WIN

SIGN, READ-INFORMATION (sign-in), RECORD-INFORMATION (sign-

up)

Two senses are considered to be synonyms if they are anchored in the same ontological concepts
and contain identical relationships with other arguments as captured by the semantic structure.
For example, a sense of a noun lady and a sense of a noun woman are considered to be synonyms
since they are anchored in the same concept,
GENDER,

WOMAN,

with the same property (relationship),

having value female. For this research, I defined synonyms as not only words having

the same dictionary definition, but words belonging to a higher-level concept and having the
same properties. For instance, ID, password, profile, and SSN are not synonyms in terms of
dictionary definition; however, they belong to

PRIVATE-INFORMATION

higher-level concept. The

main reason to adopt this expanded definition is that dictionary-based synonyms may lead to
conceptualization in a very fine grain size, which does not provide a machine with conceptual
features that are expected to be more distinguishable than lexical features.

The resources of OST are stored in a database, and they are inserted through online OST
interface. Figure 3.5, 3.6 shows the steps of adding a concept
interface.

UPDATE-INFORMATION

using the
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Figure 3.5 Adding a concept UPDATE-INFORMATION in the ontology

Figure 3.6 Added a concept UPDATE-INFORMATION in the ontology
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Each concept has at least more than one property, and properties define relations of concepts.
One of the major properties is case-role. CASE-ROLE properties specify relevant entities of event
concepts. Table 3.7 shows the used case-role properties in the phishing ontology.

Table 3.7 Case-role properties (Nirenburg & Raskin, 2004; Jurafsky & Martin, 2017)
Case role

Description

AGENT

The entity that causes or is responsible for an action

BENEFICIARY

The entity that is affected by an action

EXPERIENCER

The experiencer of an event

THEME

The entity manipulated by an action

INSTRUMENT

The object or event that is used in order to carry about an action

DESTINATION

An end point for various types of movement and transfer

Properties have domain(s) and range(s). Domain delimits types of concepts that can have the
property, and range indicates to what extent the property can reach concepts. For instance, the
property

EDIBILITY

PLANT-PART

has the concept

EAT

as domain and the concepts

FOOD, PLANT, ANIMATE,

as ranges. The interpretation of this is that a word with the concept

EAT

can be

connected to any word belonging to any of those four concepts. In the sentence “A girl ate a
candy,” ate (concept – EAT) is connected to the word candy (concept – FOOD), but in the sentence
“A girl ate a desk,” ate (concept – EAT) cannot be connected to the word desk (concept – TABLE)
since the concept TABLE does not belong to any of those range concepts.

The phishing ontology takes into account English lexicon, and lexemes are also inserted via OST
web interface. Figure 3.7, 3.8 shows the two senses of the lexical entry for the verb update.
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Figure 3.7 The first sense of the verb update

Figure 3.8 The second sense of the verb update
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Figure 3.9 describes the brief overview of an ontology and a lexicon for phishing detection and
illustrates how the verb update could have different meanings depending on its dependents.

Figure 3.9 The brief overview of ontology and two concepts for the verb update

3.4.3

Knowledge Representation

The semantic analysis of the text should provide a both human- and machine-readable outcome
for the purpose of verification, comparison, and shareability.

The OST generates a TMR for a sentence as an output. A TMR is a graph-based representation
and consists of concepts (nodes) and properties (edges). Concepts can have multiple connections
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with other concepts, and the OST finds the best TMR among possible TMRs based on the
weights of TMRs which are measured by the total distance in graphs.

The information of grammatical relations by the typed dependency parser is used to find a
lexeme’s concept by its semantic structure. Every sense of a lexeme has a semantic structure
where properties are defined. The typed dependency tags, NOMINAL_SUBJECT, AGENT,
CONTROLLING_NOMINAL_SUBJECT, are assigned to the filler value ‘^$var1’, and the rest
tags are assigned to the filler value ‘^$var2’. Figure 3.10 shows the semantic structure of a sense
of the word update corresponding to the concept

UPDATE-INFORMATION,

and Figure 3.11 shows

the semantic structure of the word update for the concept INFORM.

Figure 3.10 The semantic structure of the verb update for the concept UPDATE-INFORMATION

Figure 3.11 The semantic structure of the verb update for the concept INFORM
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When the OST processes the sentence “You must update your password,” it first finds a verb
update and its dependents (you - ^$var1, password - ^$var2), then it checks if the concept of the
dependent belongs to the range of the property. The concept of you and password is HUMAN and
PRIVATE-INFORMATION

respectively. The range of the property

AGENT

is the concept

ANIMATE

that has HUMAN concept as descendant, and the range of the property THEME-INFORMATION has a
concept

INFORMATION-OBJECT

which is an ancestor of the concept

PRIVATE-INFORMATION.

The

range of beneficiary does not have a concept INFORMATION-OBJECT. Therefore, the selected sense
of the verb update is

UPDATE-INFORMATION.

Figure 3.12 illustrates the TMR output of the

sentence.

Figure 3.12 TMR of “You must update your password.”

When the sentence “We will update you as we learn more.” is provided, the dependents you and
me of the verb update are inserted into ^$var1 and ^$var2 respectively. In the same way, if the
dependents are suitable for the property AGENT and BENEFICIARY, the concepts of you and me are
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connected to the concept INFORM by the properties. Figure 3.13 illustrates the TMR output of the
sentence.

Figure 3.13 TMR of “We will update you as we learn more.”

Figure 3.14, 3.15 shows different TMRs of input sentences containing the verb enter.

Figure 3.14 TMR of “You have entered wrong password for many times.”
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Figure 3.15 TMR of “You will enter the building on the 4th floor”
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EXPERIMENTS

The experiments aim to examine the effectiveness of word concepts as features for ML
classifiers to distinguish legitimate and phishing emails. The used ML algorithms were Logistic
Regression (LR), Support Vector Machine (SVM), and Random Forest (RF). The performance
of ML classifiers was measured by F-score which is a standard way to combine precision and
recall. This project employed Weka ML workbench (v. 3.8.2).

After the preprocessing APWG phishing emails reported from January 2017 to March 2017, the
size of dataset was reduced to 38,780. To match the number of legitimate emails with phishing
emails, I randomly selected 38,780 emails from the legitimate dataset - 19,390 from Enron
emails and 19,390 from Jeb Bush email corpus. Then, I chose the emails containing more than
one selected verb, which resulted in 27,128 phishing emails and 21,177 legitimate emails. The
proportion of emails containing selected verb(s) among the preprocessed data is 70% in the
phishing and 55% in the legitimate dataset. Table 4.1 shows the size of dataset.

Table 4.1 The size of Preprocessed data and emails containing 50 selected verbs.

Phishing

Corpus

Size of preprocessed
data

Size of data containing the selected
verb(s)

APWG Jan &
Feb & Mar 2017

38,780

27,128

Enron

19,390

Legitimate

21,177
Jeb Bush

19,390
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4.1

Experiment 1: ML on unmodified data

The first experiment introduces the baseline of comparison. The ML algorithms were trained on
four different feature sets: Email unit, Sentence unit, Lexeme unit, and Concept unit. The trained
classifiers were used to compare the prediction performances in the following experiments. To
build baseline classifiers, from the emails containing more than at least one of the selected verbs,
I randomly selected 10,000 legitimate emails (5,000 from Enron corpus and 5,000 emails Jeb
Bush corpus) and 10,000 phishing emails. The three ML algorithms were run on:

(1) Email: 10,000 legitimate 10,000 phishing emails, taking each email as data to be
classified;
(2) Sentence: sentences from the above emails that contain 50 selected action verbs; where a
classification of each sentence corresponds to the classification of the email from which it
was extracted;
(3) Lexeme: verbs with their dependents as they appear in the text of the email, where each
verb is from the list of 50 selected verbs, dependents are indicated by dependency parser,
and a classification corresponds to the classification of the emails from verbs and their
dependents that were extracted. If two identical verbs-dependents utterances are found in
different classes (one in phishing, one in legitimate emails), two conflicting data points
will be entered;
(4) Concept: OST conceptual representation of (3).

Figure 4.1 illustrates an example of (1) – (4).
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Figure 4.1 An example of the input unit for ML features
The ML algorithms trained on (1) email, (2) sentence, and (3) lexeme features were run with 10fold cross-validation, and the F-scores are shown in Figure 4.2.
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0.1
0

LR

SVM

RF

Figure 4.2 Baseline classification of unchanged text with 10-fold cross-validation.
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As can be seen from the results, the performance of email classification was consistent with the
results reported in the literature. As the input size increases, the classification performance was
improved from lexeme to sentence and from sentence to email, which indicated that
classification took more information into account than just verbs with their arguments.

To examine the effectiveness of conceptual representations, the ML classifier trained on lexeme
features (3) was compared with the classifier trained on concept features (4). The concept
feature-based model was run with 10-fold cross-validation, and Figure 4.3 demonstrates the
comparison of the F-scores between the lexeme- and concept-based classifiers. The conceptual
representation that masked the differences in lexical choices performs slightly better for LR and
SVM and slightly worse for RF than the lexeme representation, all of which may not be
significant enough.
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Figure 4.3 Classification of lexeme- and concept-based models with 10-fold cross-validation
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The number of used features was 2,460 for the lexeme-based model and 525 for the conceptbased model, which indicates that 2,460 lexemes were mapped to 525 concepts. Figure 4.4
represents some of the important features for each model ranked by the Information Gain feature
selection algorithm.

Figure 4.4 Significant features for lexeme and concept models
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As seen in the list of features, the conceptualization groups the words based on the meaning.
Some of the lexemes were mapped to different concepts. For instance, the lexeme information
can be an

INFORMATION-OBJECT

or

PRIVATE-INFORMATION

pronoun your. The lexeme bill can be a

MONEY-FINANCIAL

if it comes with the possessive

(e.g., “We will pay your next repair

bill”) or LEGAL-OBJECT (e.g., “The lawmakers approved the bill”) depending on the verb. When
words with similar meaning frequently appear, the concept of the words becomes highly
important. Lexeme features hold their own significance, and they are solely useful if and only if
the same lexemes exist. On the other hand, concept features go beyond this limitation, and the
influence of the concept is expected to be more robust and broader than separate lexemes. This
assumption was tested in the following experiment.

4.2

Experiment 2: ML on synonym substitutions

This experiment checks whether keeping the same semantic content (as defined by synonymy)
but changing word choices would decrease the performance of classification. Again, synonyms
are defined as words linked to the same concept having the same properties, if any are present.
For instance, the lexemes password, id, and SSN are linked to the concept
INFORMATION,

PRIVATE-

and therefore they are regarded as synonyms.

I reran the dataset in Experiment 1 for choices (3) and (4), but instead of using cross-validation,
the entire dataset is used as the training set for the model to be built. I used these models to
recognize emails with synonym substitutions in order to imitate a real-world situation where data
models do not change very often. I then substituted:

(5) each verb in the utterance with a synonym while leaving the dependents unchanged;
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(6) each dependent in the original utterance, while leaving the original verb unchanged;
(7) and substituting both verbs and dependents together.

Each of the substitutions (5)-(7) was run through the OST processor, which reported conceptual
representation (TMR). These representations were used for testing the concept-based model
learned from (4). Figure 4.5 illustrates the synonym substitution for this experiment.

Figure 4.5 Synonym substitution

The results for lexeme- and concept-based detection are indicated in Figure 4.6, and Table 4.2
shows the specific F-scores of the model predictions.
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Concept RF

0.9

Lexeme LR
Lexeme SVM
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Lexeme RF
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Depedent

ALL

Figure 4.6 Conceptual and Lexeme-based classification of synonym substitution

Table 4.2 F-score of Concept- and Lexeme-based Model on Synonym substitutions
Feature

Unmodified

Verb

Dependent

ALL

LR

0.85

0.848

0.847

0.847

SVM

0.844

0.842

0.842

0.841

RF

0.95

0.941

0.944

0.937

LR

0.837

0.819

0.679

0.658

SVM

0.836

0.817

0.66

0.646

RF

0.961

0.809

0.686

0.624

Model

Concept

Lexeme

The results demonstrate that lexical classification (lines in green, yellow, and red color)
decreases as the number of synonym substitutions increase. In particular, the RF lexeme model
showed the best performance among others for unchanged features, but its performance was
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dropped drastically when the lexemes were replaced with the concepts. Conceptual
classification, however, showed stable performance. The ML classifiers trained using lexical
features became vulnerable to the data with the words that were superficially (not in meaning)
different from the original lexemes. On the other hand, the ML classifiers trained using concept
features were still capable of classification of such utterances when substituted words were
represented with concepts. The slight drop in the conceptual classification with synonym
substitution can be explained by the fact that substituted words may not have the same concept as
the original lexemes as described in Figure 4.5 because lexemes can have multiple senses, and
OST processor finds the best suitable concept of the lexeme considering the relations with senses
of others.

4.3

Experiment 3: ML on emails and sentences with concepts

The third experiment examines whether concepts ameliorate the performance of ML classifiers
trained on sentence and email units. Features from sentence and email units contain not only
selected verbs and their dependents but also other words. This experiment checks if the concept
features will be representative among other features, which can help to increase classification
performance.

For this experiment, words in sentences and emails were replaced with their concepts. For
instance, if an email has the sentence “you might enter your Twitter password,” then the verb
enter and its dependents you and password are substituted with the concept
INFORMATION, HUMAN, PRIVATE-INFORMATION,
RECORD-INFORMATION

RECORD-

which generates a sentence “HUMAN might

your twitter PRIVATE-INFORMATION.” Figure 4.7 describes how to modify

the original sentence and email used in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.7 The procedure of modification on sentence and email

The performance of classifiers trained on the modified input units was compared with the
classifiers on the original input units. Figure 4.8, 4.9 represent the comparison of classifiers
between original sentences and concept sentences and that between original emails and concept
emails respectively.

Original Sentence
1
0.9

0.875

0.88

Sentence w/ Concept substitution
0.873

0.883

0.922 0.921

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1

0

LR

SVM

RF

Figure 4.8 Sentence classification of Lexeme-based and Conceptual model with 10-fold crossvalidation.
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0.957 0.958

LR
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Figure 4.9 Email classification of Lexeme-based and Conceptual model with 10-fold crossvalidation

The results illustrate that the performance between the lexeme-based model and the conceptual
model were slightly different in sentences, and performance in emails was almost identical. The
effect of the concepts for the selected verbs and dependents diminished as the collection of input
tokens for ML algorithms increased from sentences to emails. The possible explanation of this is
that sentences and emails contain other distinguishable words than the selected verbs and the
dependents.

4.4

Experiment 4: ML on different datasets

In an attempt to examine the effect of conceptualization in a real-world scenario, the trained
models in the previous experiments were tested on a different dataset. To conduct the
experiment, the trained lexeme-based and conceptual models in Experiment 1 and 3 were used to
classify newly selected datasets (test set). The phishing test set comprises 5,000 random sampled
phishing emails reported to APWG in September 2017, and the legitimate test set consists of
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5,000 random sampled emails (2,500 emails from Enron data and 2,500 Jeb Bush data). This
new collection of emails contains different emails from the dataset used in Experiment 1, and
each of the emails has more than one selected verb. Figure 4.10 depicts the process of this
experiment.

Figure 4.10 The process of Test set classification

The trained classifiers in Experiment 1 for lexical and concept classification respectively were
performed on lexeme- and concept-based test set. The results are indicated in Figure 4.11.

1
0.9

0.827 0.851

0.822

0.858

0.89
0.834

Lexeme

0.8
0.7

Concept
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0.5
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0.3
0.2
0.1
0

LR

SVM

RF

Figure 4.11 Lexeme-based and Conceptual classification on test set
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The results demonstrate that the classifier trained on concepts performed better than the classifier
trained on lexemes. The performance of a classifier trained on lexemes dropped compared to its
performance in cross-validation shown in Figure 4.3. On the other hand, the concept-based
classifier generated a consistent and even higher performance than its cross-validation result.
Namely, the performance gap between the two models is greater than the cross-validation results.
This supports the assertion that the effect of lexemes is volatile depending on the occurrence in
context; however, concepts behave consistently regardless of change in contexts (data).

As performed in Experiment 3, lexical units in sentences and emails were replaced with their
corresponding concepts, and the original test set and modified test set were classified by the
sentence- and email-based trained models in Experiment 3. Figure 4.12, 4.13 illustrate the
classification results of sentence and email units respectively.
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Sentence w/ Concept substitution

1
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0.879
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0
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Figure 4.12 Sentence classification of Lexeme-based and Conceptual model on test set
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0
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Figure 4.13 Email classification of Lexeme-based and Conceptual model on test set

The results show that the features in combination with concepts improved the ML classifiers’
performance in both units for all the three ML algorithms. In particular, the concept substitutions
in sentences were far more effective than the cross-validation classification. Compared to the
lexeme and sentence units, the concept replacement for lexical items did not significantly affect
the classifications in the email units. It is possible that the number of other features used in
classification outweigh the selected action verb indication in emails, thus increasing the
performance with a choice of more features. However, the effect of using concepts was
consistent, and notably the classification improvement using concepts and the performance gap
between solely lexeme-based and conceptual models was greater than the cross-validation results
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in Experiment 3, which indicated that the improvement became greater when the number of
lexical choices increased. This forecasts that even though the email dataset was considered to be
robust resources for machine classifiers, unseen lexical features such as synonyms of the unique
words could affect the classifiers’ performance as seen in the previous experiments.

4.5

Experiment 5: ML on expanded elements of TMR

This experiment checks if the expanded components of TMRs affect classification performance.
Specifically, the components of TMRs other than the end nodes (concepts used in the previous
experiments) were also used as features for training models. The other features include ancestor
concepts and properties. The purpose of this experiment was to compare word meaning relations
represented in TMRs between legitimate and phishing texts while increasing the number of
components.

The concept model trained in Experiment 1 was compared with three different models: all
concepts, all concepts and properties, and trigrams models. The features of all concepts model
include all nodes (concepts and their ancestors) in TMRs. The features of all concept and
properties contain all edges (properties) as well as all nodes. Among properties, IS-A properties
define concept hierarchies, and they do not hold other significant semantic information other
than relations between ancestors and successors. Therefore, IS-A properties were excluded from
the selected feature sets. Lastly, the features of trigrams model consist of a maximum three
connections of elements (nodes and edges) in TMRs. Table 4.3 describes the features of the
TMR in Figure 4.14 for the four models.
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Figure 4.14 TMR of the sentence

Table 4.3 An example of features for the four models
Selected concepts

HUMAN, RECORD-INFORMATION, PRIVATE-INFORMATION

All concepts

HUMAN, RECORD-INFORMATION, INFORMATION-OBJECT,
PRIVATE-INFORMATION

All concepts &
properties

Trigrams

HUMAN, AGENT, RECORD-INFORMATION, THEME-INFORMATION,
INFORMATION-OBJECT, PRIVATE-INFORMATION

(HUMAN, AGENT, RECORD-INFORMATION),
(AGENT, RECORD-INFORMATION, THEME-INFORMATION),
(RECORD-INFORMATION, THEME-INFORMATION, INFORMATION-OBJECT),
(THEME-INFORMATION, INFORMATION-OBJECT, PRIVATE-INFORMATION),
(INFORMATION-OBJECT, PRIVATE-INFORMATION, NULL)

The four models were evaluated with 10-fold cross-validation, and the trained models predicted
the test set used in Experiment 4. Each result is demonstrated in Figure 4.15 and 4.16.

94

1

0.843

0.9

0.839
0.837
0.836 0.808

0.888
0.832
0.83 0.802

0.886
0.886

0.86

0.8

Selected
Concepts
All concepts

0.7
0.6

All concepts +
properties

0.5
0.4

Trigrams

0.3
0.2

0.1
0

LR

SVM

RF

Figure 4.15 10-fold cross-validation of the four models
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Figure 4.16 The prediction on the test set of the four models
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The result shows that the model trained on the selected concepts performed better than the other
models in both cross-validation and train/test set evaluation, and the inclusion of other
components of TMRs deteriorated the classification performance. The ancestor concepts
between legitimate and phishing emails were akin to each other, and this led to the similar
properties of verbs since the properties of verbs are first connected to the value of the property
range (the highest ancestor of the selected concept). Therefore, as the number of other elements
in TMRs increased, the selected concepts (the end nodes in a graph indicating direct concepts of
a sense of lexemes) became less effective, and thereby the classifiers’ performance decreased
from all concepts to all concepts & properties, from all concepts & properties to trigrams. This
finding revealed that word senses in higher level between the two classes are not quite different,
and thereby it can be inferred that the difference in meaning of sentences is subtle.
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CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

Phishing has become a perpetual and destructive threat to our lives. Phishing is a type of social
engineering attack in which phishers disguise themselves as a trustworthy entity and abuse
unsuspecting users’ mind to elicit private information. Confidential and sensitive information,
that is exposed though phishing attacks, is misused by criminals in order to achieve monetary
gain or compromise organization’s internal networks. Cybercriminals typically carry out
phishing attacks by sending emails to users in an attempt to force the recipients to do some kind
of actions such as clicking links, opening attachments, or replying to the senders with sensitive
information. Organizations and academics have acknowledged that phishing attempts are one of
the most hazardous actions as information security threats, and security personnel and experts
have fought against phishing attacks. However, phishing still remains extremely dangerous, and
there is no robust defense mechanism to effectively cope with such attacks up to now.

The previous works with different aspects proved their usefulness within the experimental
environments. However, most of the defense systems depend on superficial features and revealed
the limitations when new types of emails were fed into the systems. Defenders have fortified
security borders based on the previous attacks, but the attackers have found new ways to
infiltrate the boundary. This counter-attack cycle has been going on for years. It seems like the
endless combat. A possible reason of difficulties in finding robust counter-measures against such
chronic threats is that the previous works ignored or merely touched upon one of the
fundamental factors of phishing attack, which is a semantic part. The criminals exploit the
contents of genuine emails and adopt the same or similar words from legitimate texts to make a
phishing email more legitimate. It is important to analyze email texts from the semantic point of
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view to catch subtle differences between genuine emails and fake emails. To extract semantic
components from email texts, this dissertation suggests an ontological semantic model equipped
with reasoning and knowledge sources. To achieve the goal, the proposed model employed OST
to build a phishing ontology. The phishing ontology was used to disambiguate word senses and
conceptualize words based on meaning. The conceptualization of words was incorporated to ML,
and ML algorithms utilized the concepts of words for the phishing email classification task.

This research analyzed word senses (concepts) based on semantic relations between a verb and
its syntactic dependents in a sentence. To create baseline models to be compared to the proposed
approach, a typical method of text analysis, dealing with bag-of-words features, was first
performed with different sizes of input tokens. The ML classification result showed that the
classification performance improved as the feature unit expands from lexeme to sentence, from
sentence to email, which implies that the models trained on sentences and emails take more
information into account than just verbs with their arguments. When the lexemes were mapped
to the corresponding concepts, the number of inputs for ML algorithms were far reduced, which
indicates that many words were grouped based on the meaning. It was expected that the concept
features be more robust than the volatile lexeme features, and this hypothesis was verified in the
second experiment. When the lexemes were replaced with their synonyms, the lexeme-based
classifiers’ performance was dramatically dropped; on the other hand, the classifiers trained on
the concepts produced consistent results regardless of the number of synonym substitution.

To check if the concepts are still representative in larger domains, the third experiment explored
the effectiveness of concepts in sentence and emails units. The verbs and their dependents in

98
sentences and emails were substituted with the corresponding concepts. The results demonstrated
that concept-substituted models performed slightly better than the original models, but the
increase in the number features made the concepts less effective in ML performances.

In the fourth experiment, I conducted the experiments for the effectiveness of conceptualization
in a real-world scenario. I tested the previously trained models on new datasets. The conceptbased classifiers constantly produced better results than lexeme-based classifiers, and the gap
between the two models was greater than that of cross-validation of the training data. The
experiments showed how vulnerable a classifier becomes to lexical deviations a lexeme-based.
Concept-based detection of sentences and entire email body also performed better than lexemebased detection. Although the improvement was not as significant as it between lexeme and
concept models, the models incorporating concepts showed similar trend of stability that was
seen in word-based vs. concept-based sentence detection, and the concepts were more useful to
improve the machine’s phishing detection ability in a different dataset compared to its indication
in the training data.

The fifth and last experiment examined if the expansion of features for concept models improved
the classification performance. The results indicated that components other than direct concepts
of words in TMRs decreased the classifiers’ prediction ability. This may lead to the conclusion
that word meanings show subtle difference between legitimate and phishing classes since the
words have common semantic ancestors and similar relations among senses.
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This project demonstrated that materials to teach a machine phishing detection need to go
beyond superficial clues. Semantic features proved to be useful resources to ameliorate machines’
phishing detection capability. Lexical feature-based models became more vulnerable to unseen
data than the models that leveraged conceptualization. However, challenges still remain. The
effectiveness of conceptualization decreases as the number of uncontrolled features increases. It
needs to be further implemented to analyze semantic aspects of emails in a broader spectrum.
Phishing is a semantic attack, and more attention needs to be paid to find subtle differences
between phishing messages and authentic ones.

The future direction is to discover frames in phishing messages using further semantic elements
and exploring how to measure similarity of knowledge representations other than the statistical
way. To achieve it, it is necessary to conduct semantic analysis in a broader scope beyond
sentence units, and ways to integrate human knowledge and reuse knowledge sources needs to be
explored. Additionally, semantic annotation for emails can be useful resources to improve user
education.

Expansion of WSD scope: This project analyzed texts in a sentence boundary to identify word
senses. Sometimes, word meaning cannot be resolved solely on a sentence boundary. To
understand the right meaning of a word, contextual meaning is required. Anaphora (co-reference),
relations between sentences with its preceding or following sentences, ellipses, and concepts
existing in a text affect the meaning of word. In the following sentences, “Your password will
expire in 24hours. Please change it as soon as possible,” the pronoun it in the latter sentence
denotes password in the former sentence. Anaphora resolution replaces it with password and
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finds the concept of password which is a

PRIVATE-INFORMATION.

The choice of the appropriate

size of context (i.e. the number of sentences before or after the target sentence, paragraph
containing the target sentence) is a critical factor to disambiguate word senses since the word
meaning can vary depending on the size of context (Navigli, 2009), and this needs to be
investigated in an empirical way.

Brevity and Reuse of Knowledge Representation: As the scope of semantic analysis units
increase, knowledge representations might contain too much information, which causes
computation complexity and produces improper TMRs. Shorthand and common-sense rules are
used to reduce the size of TMRs. Natural languages tend to take shortcuts to avoid verbose
explicit descriptions, and to deal with this kind of information (implicit knowledge) the ontology
contains properties to serve convenient shortcuts (Taylor, Raskin & Hempelmann, 2011). To
describe a human’s hair-color, it should be premised that people have hair. Therefore, this long
description TMR #1 can be rewritten in TMR #2 by the property HAIR-COLOR.

TMR #1: HUMAN(HAS-OBJECT-AS-PART(VALUE(HAIR(HAS-COLOR(VALUE(BROWN))))))
TMR #2: HUMAN(HAIR-COLOR(VALUE(BROWN)))

TMRs are stored in Infobase which is a database of TMRs, and Infobase can be used to build
accurate TMRs. A TMR is generated on a sentence unit, and the preceding TMR can affect the
creation of the following TMR which can be achieved by the stored TMRs in Infobase.

Email Annotations for User Education: To improve user education, it is useful to supply
phishing samples tagged with semantic meanings of text together with legitimate ones to help
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users identify differences between the two domains. The provision of comparing samples may
intrigue users to re-think about their ability and correct their misconceptions. The lack of reliably
usable email datasets has hampered the phishing detection development. In particular, there is no
dataset that contains similar emails between phishing and non-phishing for comparison. It is
definitely useful to have representative phishing samples similar to legitimate ones in terms of
contents to teach users to discriminate between the two. The annotated phishing emails can be
used for user’s phishing awareness education and campaign. To annotate representative phishing
emails with semantic tags, knowledge representations of OST can be used. The concepts of
words and connections of them will be displayed in the email with the original text. The concepts
and their relations will be colored differently based on their significance in phishing emails in
order to warn that those are suspicious by colors (e.g. deep red colored – very suspicious, light
red colored – a little suspicious, light blue colored – a little safe, deep blue colored – very safe).
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